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END THE EXPERIMENT: THE
ATTORNEY–CLIENT PRIVILEGE SHOULD
NOT PROTECT COMMUNICATIONS IN
THE ALLIED LAWYER SETTING
*

BY GRACE M. GIESEL

In recent years, courts have seen an explosion of claims that
communications need not be disclosed because they enjoy the protection
of something often referred to as the “common interest doctrine.” These
claims—claims of attorney–client privilege—occur in two situations: the
joint client setting and the allied lawyer setting. In a joint client situation,
an attorney represents two or more clients on a matter with all parties
working together on the joint endeavor. In an allied lawyer situation,
several entities or individuals work together on a matter of common
interest but the parties have separate lawyers.
This Article argues, uncontroversially, that the privilege should
continue to apply to communications in the joint client situation. In
contrast, this Article argues, quite controversially, that communications in
the allied lawyer setting should not enjoy the protection of the privilege.
Applying the privilege to the joint client setting is simply applying the
privilege to communications between an attorney and that attorney’s
clients—clients who have engaged the attorney to represent them jointly.
Applying the privilege furthers the rationale of the privilege. When the
privilege is applied in the allied lawyer setting, however, the privilege
protects communications that are not between an attorney and that
attorney’s client. The application does not further the privilege’s
rationale. In addition, the confusion surrounding the application of the
privilege in this setting has eviscerated the certainty necessary for the
privilege to accomplish any goal. Any possible benefit to the application
is outweighed by the damage done to the truth-finding mission of the
justice system. Applying the privilege in the allied lawyer setting is a
practice based on a flawed precedent from 1871 and followed by courts
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I. INTRODUCTION
1

In recent years courts have seen a veritable explosion of claims that
communications need not be disclosed because they enjoy the
protection of something often referred to as the “common interest
2
3
doctrine,” the “joint defense privilege,” the “community of interest
4
5
doctrine,” or some similar term. These claims are, in effect, claims of
1. A search in the ALLCASES portion of the Westlaw database revealed that 168 cases
in the decade spanning 2000–2009 contained a reference to the Digest Key for Privileges
entitled “Common interest doctrine; joint clients or joint defense.” In contrast, in the decade
spanning 1970–1979, only twenty-five cases contained such a reference.
2. See, e.g., Hunton & Williams v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 590 F.3d 272, 274 (4th Cir.
2010); Evergreen Trading, LLC ex rel. Nussdorf v. United States, 80 Fed. Cl. 122, 143 (2007).
3. See, e.g., United States v. Austin, 416 F.3d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 2005).
4. See, e.g., In re United States, 590 F.3d 1305, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2009), rev’d sub nom.
United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 131 S. Ct. 2313 (2011).
5. See, e.g., In re Teleglobe Commc’ns Corp., 493 F.3d 345, 359 (3d Cir. 2007)
(“community-of-interest (or common-interest) privilege”); Mass. Eye & Ear Infirmary v.
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6

attorney–client privilege. Parties to litigation and courts use these
terms in two basic situations. This Article refers to these situations as
7
8
the joint client setting and the allied lawyer setting. In a joint client
representation, an attorney represents two or more clients on a matter
with all parties working together on the joint endeavor. Those clients
agree, expressly or implicitly, to have one attorney represent them all
9
and render advice to all, jointly. Unlike in the joint client situation, in
an allied lawyer situation several entities or individuals work together
on a common matter, but the entities or individuals are separately

QLT Phototherapeutics, Inc., 412 F.3d 215, 225 (1st Cir. 2005) (“common-interest
exception”); N. Am. Rescue Prods., Inc. v. Bound Tree Med., LLC, No. 2:08-cv-101, 2010 WL
1873291, at *4 (S.D. Ohio May 10, 2010) (“joint defense or common interest privilege”; “joint
defense exception”). Some courts and commentators have noted the semantic confusion.
See, e.g., Lugosch v. Congel, 219 F.R.D. 220, 236 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) (“[The] joint defense
privilege has many monikers such as the common interest doctrine, common interest
arrangement doctrine, or pooled information doctrine. Unfortunately, courts, commentators,
and attorneys use these terms interchangeably even when they do not serve the same
purpose.”); see also George S. Mahaffey Jr., Taking Aim at the Hydra: Why the “Allied-Party
Doctrine” Should Not Apply in Qui Tam Cases When the Government Declines to Intervene,
23 REV. LITIG. 629, 631–33 (2004) (cataloguing the mishmash of terms before choosing
“allied-party doctrine”).
6. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena: Under Seal, 415 F.3d 333, 341 (4th Cir. 2005)
(describing the “joint defense privilege” as “an extension of the attorney–client privilege”);
Leader Techs., Inc. v. Facebook, Inc., 719 F. Supp. 2d 373, 376 (D. Del. 2010) (discussing the
common interest doctrine as “an exception to the general rule that the attorney–client
privilege is waived following disclosure of privileged materials to a third party”). See
generally Craig S. Lerner, Conspirators’ Privilege and Innocents’ Refuge: A New Approach to
Joint Defense Agreements, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1449 (2002). Some argue, however, that
the privilege should be severed from the attorney–client privilege and stand alone. See, e.g.,
Deborah Stavile Bartel, Reconceptualizing the Joint Defense Doctrine, 65 FORDHAM L. REV.
871, 874 (1996) (arguing that the “joint defense doctrine” is distinct from the attorney–client
privilege).
7. Section 75 of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers refers to clients
“jointly represented” by a lawyer as “co-client[s].” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 75 (2000). The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct refer to
this sort of representation as “common representation.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmts. 29–33 (2011).
8. This term, coined by Wright and Graham, seems to best define the situation and
separate it from the joint client situation. See 24 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W.
GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5493 (1986) (using the term “allied
lawyer doctrine”).
9. An example of a joint client situation is one attorney representing two people who are
both planning to invest in a business. Both people might want legal advice with regard to
those investments and agree that the attorney should represent them jointly. For a discussion
of joint client representation, see infra Part IV.A.
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10

represented.
This Article argues, uncontroversially, that the attorney–client
privilege should continue to apply to communications in the joint client
situation. Thus, the attorney–client privilege should apply if the
communications involve an attorney and the attorney’s joint clients and
if the communications are for the purpose of obtaining legal advice, are
11
made in confidence, and do not further a crime or fraud.
This Article also argues, quite controversially and contrary to recent
precedent, that communications in the allied lawyer setting should not
enjoy the advantage of a privilege. In contrast to how the privilege
works in the allied lawyer setting, applying the privilege to the joint
client setting is simply applying the privilege to communications
between an attorney and that attorney’s clients—clients who have
engaged the attorney to represent them jointly. Applying the privilege
in the joint client setting furthers the rationale of the privilege. When
the privilege is applied in the allied lawyer setting, however, the
privilege protects communications that are not between an attorney and
that attorney’s clients. Thus, the application in the allied lawyer setting
does not further the privilege’s rationale. In addition, the confusion
surrounding the application of the privilege in this setting has
eviscerated the certainty necessary for the privilege to accomplish any
goal. Any possible benefit is outweighed by the damage done to the
truth-finding mission of the justice system. Applying the privilege in the
allied lawyer setting is a practice based on a flawed precedent from 1871
12
and followed by courts only in recent decades. It is a practice that
should not continue.
Historically, courts have applied the attorney–client privilege readily
to communications in the joint client situation when a third party is
seeking disclosure. This application has not been the subject of

10. An example of this situation from the criminal context is two defendants charged
with robbery who each have an attorney and who desire to work together to present a
consistent defense. An example in a civil context is a situation in which a corporation and
one of its officer-employees are sued individually. The corporation and the officer-employee
may have separate attorneys but choose to work together on a common defense. For a
discussion of the allied lawyer situation, see infra Part V.
11. See infra Part II for a discussion of the attorney–client privilege in general. See
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 32 F.3d 851, 862 (3d Cir. 1994), for a typical
definition of the attorney–client privilege.
12. See infra Parts III.A, III.C.
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13

dispute. In fact, the application of the attorney–client privilege to the
joint client setting has served to define the total-sharing and no-secrets
nature of a joint client representation.
Conversely, in the allied lawyer situation, members of a group who
have agreed to work together on a matter have separate attorneys. The
attorneys might share with each other communications each has had
with his or her own client. One or all clients and one or all attorneys
might meet and discuss matters. The clients themselves might discuss
matters without the presence of an attorney.
Unlike the
communications in the joint client setting, these communications are not
14
solely between attorney and client.
Rather, these communications
occur within the circle of clients and the attorneys who represent those
persons or entities separately. Courts have faced increasing numbers of
claims that such communications should be privileged under the
15
common interest doctrine or a synonym of that doctrine.
There is a semantic confusion of terminology in this area of
attorney–client privilege jurisprudence. But this area of law is rife with
a confusion of substance as well—a confusion leading to a suboptimal
16
result in attorney–client jurisprudence. The remedy is to eliminate
application of the privilege to the allied lawyer setting while embracing
the historically accepted application of the attorney–client privilege to
the joint client situation.
13. See, e.g., Rice v. Rice, 53 Ky. (14 B. Mon.) 335, 336 (1854); Root v. Wright, 84 N.Y.
(39 Sickels) 72, 76 (1881).
14. Not all courts agree that the privilege applies if an attorney is not present. See, e.g.,
Cooper Health Sys. v. Virtua Health, Inc., 259 F.R.D. 208, 214 (D.N.J. 2009) (“[T]he privilege
does not extend to communications between non-attorneys who simply have a joint interest.
The community of interest privilege is applicable to communications amongst
attorneys . . . .”); United States v. Gotti, 771 F. Supp. 535, 545 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (“The
defendants would extend the application of the joint defense privilege to conversations
among the defendants themselves even in the absence of any attorney during the course of
those conversations. Such an extension is supported neither in law nor in logic and is
rejected.”); see also discussion infra Part V.F.4.
15. Of the twenty-five cases in the decade 1970–1979 contained in the Westlaw
ALLCASES database and cataloged in the Digest Key for Privileges entitled “Common
interest doctrine; joint clients or joint defense,” only five of the cases involved allied lawyer
settings. In the decade of 2000–2009, the vast majority of the 168 cases cataloged in that
Digest Key involved allied lawyer settings. See, e.g., United States v. Almeida, 341 F.3d 1318,
1324 (11th Cir. 2003) (exploring the allied lawyer context and “joint defense privilege”);
United States v. Newell, 315 F.3d 510, 525 (5th Cir. 2002) (discussing the allied lawyer context
and “common legal interest rule”).
16. See infra Part IV.B.4.
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The attorney–client privilege exists to encourage clients to make
17
complete disclosure to their attorneys.
The privilege protects
communications between attorneys and clients from compelled
disclosure and this protection encourages clients to make full disclosure
to their counsel. Full disclosure allows lawyers to render the best and
most apt legal advice. In a preventative view, clients may adapt their
conduct to abide by the law in response to this superior advice. If
clients, though not perfectly certain, are at least generally certain that
the privilege protects their communications with counsel from disclosure
18
in future proceedings, clients may disclose more fully.
This rationale justifies applying the privilege to joint client
situations. A communication between an attorney and one or more of
the attorney’s joint clients is a communication between attorney and
client. Protecting such communications from disclosure with the
attorney–client privilege, theoretically, encourages full disclosure by the
19
client group to the attorney. Applying the attorney–client privilege in
the joint client situation thus furthers the ultimate goal of superior legal
advice. Courts have accepted application of the privilege in the joint
client setting throughout the life of the modern attorney–client
20
privilege; recognition of the privilege in this setting does not expand
traditional doctrine. Indeed, the nature of joint representation and the
ethical constraints on any attorney handling a joint representation make
21
application of the privilege relatively straightforward.
17. See infra notes 68–69, 72–75 and accompanying text.
18. See infra Part II for a discussion of the attorney–client privilege and its rationale.
19. See PAUL R. RICE, ATTORNEY–CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES § 4:30
(2011) (“The rationale for extending the protection of the attorney–client privilege to
communications among several clients and their jointly retained attorney is no different from
the basic rationale for the attorney–client privilege itself. It ensures more informed, and
therefore, more effective legal advice and assistance, through the concerted efforts of
individuals with common legal interests.”); see also Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383,
389 (1981) (stating that the purpose of the attorney–client privilege is to “encourage full and
frank communication between attorneys and their clients”).
20. See, e.g., Rice v. Rice, 53 Ky. (14 B. Mon.) 335, 336 (1854) (applying privilege to joint
client situation); Harris v. Daugherty, 11 S.W. 921, 923 (Tex. 1889) (applying privilege to joint
client situation); see also infra Part IV.B.3. For a recent example of courts’ acceptance of the
attorney–client privilege in the joint client setting, see Raymond v. N.C. Police Benevolent
Ass’n, Inc., No. 230PA10, 2011 WL 1378605, at *3 (N.C. Apr. 8, 2011), in which the court
stated, “This Court . . . has . . . recognized a multiparty attorney–client relationship in which
an attorney represents two or more clients.” The court then applied the privilege to such a
joint client representation. Id. at *4.
21. See infra Part IV.B for a discussion of joint clients and the attorney–client privilege.
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In contrast, the disclosure-encouragement rationale does not justify
applying the privilege to communications in the allied lawyer situation
because any such privileged communication is not a communication
between an attorney and that attorney’s client. Applying the privilege
in the allied lawyer context does not encourage frank attorney–client
communications that can improve legal representation, which is the
22
heart of the privilege’s purpose.
Other proposed justifying rationales—such as increased efficiency of
representation, increased efficiency of the judicial system, or increased
effectiveness of representation—cannot survive cost–benefit analysis.
Any efficiency benefit to representation or to the judicial system as a
23
whole is doubtful. Likewise, it is not at all clear that applying the
attorney–client privilege in the allied lawyer context improves the
24
effectiveness of the representation rendered.
Even if applying the
privilege creates a benefit, the cost of creating that benefit—by limiting
the information reaching the truth-finder and, therefore, handicapping
the truth-finding process of the judicial system—outweighs any benefit
created.
The case credited as the first to apply the attorney–client privilege in
the allied lawyer setting, the 1871 Virginia Supreme Court case of
25
Chahoon v. Commonwealth, reached its conclusion by analogizing the
26
allied lawyer situation to the joint client situation. The court decided
that the allied lawyer situation was basically the same as the joint client
situation and should be treated the same for purposes of attorney–client
27
privilege.
This conclusion was in error. The joint client situation differs
fundamentally from the allied lawyer situation in the nature of the
relationship between the attorneys and the clients. That difference is
central to the appropriateness of application of the attorney–client
privilege. In a joint client representation, the privilege applies to
communications within an attorney–client relationship, as the attorney–
client privilege does in all other settings. In an allied lawyer situation,
22. See infra Part V for a discussion of the allied lawyer setting and the attorney–client
privilege.
23. See infra Part V.E; see also Lerner, supra note 6, at 1528–30.
24. See infra Part V.C.1.
25. 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 822 (1871).
26. Id. at 841.
27. See id. For a discussion of the Chahoon case, see infra Part III.A.

08-GIESEL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2011–2012]

3/20/2012 2:05 PM

END THE EXPERIMENT

483

the communications are not within an attorney–client relationship. In
an allied lawyer setting, contrary to the conclusion of the Chahoon
court, a lawyer does not represent other parties who have agreed to
work with the lawyer’s client simply by virtue of an agreement between
the parties to work together. The lawyer does not have an attorney–
client relationship with those other parties; those parties have their own
separate counsel. Therefore, when a court applies the attorney–client
privilege to communications in the allied lawyer setting, the privilege
protects communications that are not solely between an attorney and
the attorney’s client. As some courts have applied the privilege, the
28
privileged communication may not even involve a lawyer at all. The
fact that the communication in the allied lawyer setting is not between
an attorney and his or her client is a huge and fundamental difference
between applying the privilege in the joint client setting and applying
the privilege in the allied lawyer setting.
Courts within the first one hundred years after the Chahoon case
may have realized the faults in that opinion. Only a few cases applied
29
the privilege in the allied lawyer setting during that time. In recent
years, however, the use of the privilege in the allied lawyer setting has
30
increased greatly. This increase is a significant expansion of traditional
privilege law. This expansion has occurred even though courts
throughout the life of the attorney–client privilege have counseled
against expansion and warned that the privilege should be construed
31
narrowly because of its potentially deleterious effect on truth-finding.
The few decades in which courts have applied the privilege in the
allied lawyer setting have shown that the courts are not only deceived
about the necessity of applying the privilege to the setting but also
greatly flummoxed about how and when to apply the privilege in such
32
settings. The federal system has no codified rule of evidence dealing
33
with the attorney–client privilege or any related privilege, so the only

28. See, e.g., Gucci Am., Inc. v. Gucci, No. 07 Civ. 6820(RBM)(JCF), 2008 WL 5251989,
at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2008) (attorney not necessary).
29. See infra Part III for a discussion of those cases.
30. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
31. See infra Part II.E.
32. See infra Part V.A for a discussion about this confusion.
33. See generally Paul R. Rice & Neals-Erik William Delker, Federal Rules of Evidence
Advisory Committee: A Short History of Too Little Consequence, 191 F.R.D. 678 (2000)
(discussing the disapproval of the proposed rule).
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source of guidance is court-made law. Some states have codified the
attorney–client privilege. Some of those states have included at least a
passing reference to the allied lawyer and joint client concepts in the
34
codifications. Even in such states, however, the courts shoulder much
of the burden of developing the doctrine and filling in the interstices left

34. See, e.g., ARK. R. EVID. 502; KY. R. EVID. 503; TEX. R. EVID. 503. These statutes
obliquely acknowledge the allied lawyer setting by stating that the privilege applies, for
example, to a communication involving a lawyer representing another party in a matter of
common interest. See, e.g., KY. R. EVID. 503(b) (limiting the allied lawyer concept to
communications “[b]y the client or a representative of the client or the client’s lawyer or a
representative of the lawyer representing another party in a pending action and concerning a
matter of common interest”); TEX. R. EVID. 503(b) (limiting the allied lawyer concept to
communications “by the client or a representative of the client, or the client’s lawyer or a
representative of the lawyer, to a lawyer or a representative of a lawyer representing another
party in a pending action and concerning a matter of common interest”). State codifications
indirectly acknowledge that the privilege applies to the joint client setting; the privilege no
longer applies where joint clients later become adverse in an action and one former joint
client seeks to have a communication from the joint representation produced and admitted.
See, e.g., KY. R. EVID. 503 (d)(5) (exception applies “to a communication relevant to a matter
of common interest between or among two . . . or more clients if the communication was
made by any of them to a lawyer retained or consulted in common, when offered in an action
between or among any of the clients”); TEX. R. EVID. 503(d)(5) (applying exception “to a
communication relevant to a matter of common interest between or among two or more
clients if the communication was made by any of them to a lawyer retained or consulted in
common, when offered in an action between or among any of the clients”).
These states generally have followed Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 503, which was
never adopted as the federal statute. 56 F.R.D. 183 (1972). Proposed Federal Rule of
Evidence 503 provides in relevant part as follows:
(b) General rule of privilege. A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and
to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications made for
the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to the client,
(1) between himself or his representative and his lawyer or his lawyer’s
representative, or (2) between his lawyer and the lawyer’s representative, or (3) by
him or his lawyer to a lawyer representing another in a matter of common interest,
or (4) between representatives of the client or between the client and a
representative of the client, or (5) between lawyers representing the client.
....
(d) Exceptions. There is no privilege under this rule:
....
(5) Joint Clients. As to a communication relevant to a matter of common
interest between two or more clients if the communication was made by any of
them to a lawyer retained or consulted in common, when offered in an action
between any of the clients.
56 F.R.D at 235.
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35

by codification.
The courts have not proved themselves able to create a workable
doctrine, and the courts’ opinions show a decided lack of clarity. One of
the biggest problems has been defining the commonality element
necessary to justify the privilege in an allied lawyer setting. In joint
client representation, the nature of the representation provides the
needed commonality because an attorney cannot ethically represent
36
clients jointly unless the clients’ interests dovetail significantly.
Conversely, while all courts agree that a common interest is necessary in
an allied lawyer situation for a communication to be privileged, court
opinions do not uniformly define or apply the common interest
37
requirement to the facts before those courts. Courts have tried to
define the necessary common interest and have attempted to apply that
38
definition to a vast myriad of possible fact settings. Yet, courts have
not been able to do so in a way that allows parties to predict with a
degree of certainty at the time of the communication that disclosure of
39
the communication cannot be compelled at a later time. Certainty is
40
vital, of course, if a privilege is to accomplish its goal. Absence of
41
certainty eviscerates the impact of the privilege.
In addition, the courts have jumbled together claims arising in the
joint client setting and those arising in the allied lawyer setting as if they
42
were all the same to be governed by the same privilege doctrine. This

35. For example, California has codified its attorney–client privilege at CAL. EVID.
CODE §§ 950–962 (West 2009). Even so, California courts are called upon to explain and
clarify the reach of the privilege. See, e.g., People v. Gionis, 892 P.2d 1199 (Cal. 1995)
(attorney need not be retained for the privilege to apply); Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct.,
66 Cal. Rptr. 3d 833 (Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (clarifying bounds of privilege regarding a
corporate client).
36. See infra Part IV.B.4.
37. See, e.g., Evergreen Trading, LLC ex rel. Nussdorf v. United States, 80 Fed. Cl. 122,
143–44 (2007) (requiring a “common legal interest”); Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc.,
397 F. Supp. 1146, 1172 (D.S.C. 1974) (requiring “an identical legal interest”); see also In re
Teleglobe Commc’ns Corp., 493 F.3d 345, 364–65 (3d Cir. 2007) (discussing various tests).
38. See infra Part V.F for a discussion of attempts to define common interest and a
discussion of the contexts in which courts have applied that concept.
39. See infra Part V.F.
40. See infra Part II.F for a discussion of certainty.
41. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981) (“An uncertain privilege, or
one which purports to be certain but results in widely varying applications by the courts, is
little better than no privilege at all.”).
42. The Third Circuit, in Teleglobe Communications Corp., lamented that “much of the
caselaw confuses the community-of-interest privilege (which is the same as the ‘common-
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trend has caused courts to view the common interest in the joint client
setting as the same requirement as is demanded in the allied lawyer
setting. In the joint client setting, however, the commonality springs
from the nature of the joint representation. If there is a true joint
representation, there should be no additional commonality requirement.
If the communication is in furtherance of the joint representation, the
privilege should apply to the communication. No such inherent
43
commonality exists in the allied lawyer setting, thus necessitating a
definition of required commonality.
Lack of clarity exists elsewhere as well. Courts do not agree about
the level of proof necessary regarding the intention to work together on
a matter in the allied lawyer setting: some courts demand proof of an
44
agreement, while other courts require less.
Courts disagree about
whether the privilege can exist in the allied lawyer setting if no litigation
45
is in existence or at least on the horizon. Clearly, this is irrelevant in
the joint client setting. If the attorney ethically represents two or more
clients as joint clients, the privilege applies regardless of the threat of
litigation or the existence of any agreement between the clients.
Finally, courts disagree about who must be a party to the
communication in the allied lawyer setting to invoke the privilege.
Some courts apply the privilege only if a communication involves an
interest privilege’) with the co-client privilege.” 493 F.3d at 363 n.18 (internal citations
omitted).
43. The court in Teleglobe Communications Corp. noted this distinction:
Second, while the Restatement (confusingly) uses the term “common interest” to
describe the congruence of the parties’ interests in both co-client and communityof-interest situations, the concepts are not the same. Compare RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 75(1) (“If two or more persons are
jointly represented by the same lawyer in a matter, a communication of either coclient that . . . relates to matters of common interest is privileged as against third
persons.”), with id. § 76(1) (“If two or more clients with a common interest in a
litigated or nonlitigated matter are represented by separate lawyers and they agree
to exchange information concerning the matter, a communication of any such client
. . . is privileged as against third persons.”) . . . . In particular, because co-clients
agree to share all information related to the matter of common interest with each
other and to employ the same attorney, their legal interests must be identical (or
nearly so) in order that an attorney can represent them all with the candor, vigor,
and loyalty that our ethics require.
493 F.3d at 365–66.
44. See infra Part V.F.2 for a discussion of the proof of intention confusion.
45. See infra Part V.F.3 for a discussion of the existence of confusion over the need for
litigation.
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attorney. Some courts require both the discloser and the recipient to be
lawyers. Other courts appear willing to apply the privilege to any
communications within the circle of parties and lawyers with a common
46
interest.
The lack of a strong guiding rationale to temper the definition and
application of the privilege in the allied lawyer situation is a major cause
47
of the courts’ confusion. The confusion creates an uncertainty that
undermines any goals the privilege is designed to achieve. The
confusion also means that no client can be sure of the protection that a
statement may receive. Thus, the privilege does not encourage the
disclosure necessary for any possible justifying rationale. If there is no
encouragement of disclosure, then there is no raison d’etre for the
48
privilege in the allied lawyer setting.
In addition, recognition of privilege in the allied lawyer situation
contradicts one of the guiding principles of attorney–client privilege
jurisprudence. Courts have long taken great care in their delineation of
the bounds of the attorney–client privilege because of the well-grounded
speculation that the privilege keeps information vital to the truthfinding process away from the truth-finder and thus hinders an ultimate
49
goal of the entire judicial system. Courts repeat the mantra that the
attorney–client privilege is to be applied narrowly in light of this
50
deleterious effect on the truth-finding process. Applying a privilege to
an allied lawyer situation is anything but a narrow application of the
51
privilege.
Also, recognition of the privilege in allied lawyer situations
disparages the confidentiality requirement of the privilege. While

46. See infra Part V.F.4 for a discussion of the existence of confusion about parties to the
communication.
47. See infra Part V.E.
48. See infra Part II.F for a discussion about the need for certainty in a communication’s
privilege to encourage disclosure.
49. See infra Part II.E.
50. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Phil., 951 F.2d 1414, 1423 (3d
Cir. 1991) (finding that the attorney–client privilege is narrowly construed because it
“obstructs the truth-finding process”).
51. See infra Part V.D; see also Mahaffey, supra note 5, at 651 (“In light of the
historically narrow approach taken to the application of privileges, it is a bit disconcerting
that a number of courts have seen fit to broadly construe the attorney–client privilege and
work–product doctrine of late.”).
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52

historically not always so, the modern attorney–client privilege applies
53
only to communications intended to be confidential.
This
confidentiality requirement minimizes the privilege’s harmful effect on
the truth-finding process by limiting the set of possibly privileged
communications. The basis of the confidentiality requirement is the
theory that a client who does not care about the confidentiality of a
communication will disclose the information to his or her lawyer even
without the privilege. Protection of the privilege, thus, is not needed to
encourage the communication. In implementing the confidentiality
requirement, modern courts generally have held that the presence of a
third party for a communication indicates a lack of intent that the
communication be confidential. The result is that courts find such
54
communications not privileged.
Likewise, even though the
communication between client and lawyer might be privileged at the
time of the communication, courts have held that later sharing the
52. In fact, the opinion in Chahoon, where a communication in an allied lawyer situation
was first found to be privileged, may have been influenced by the earlier law of privilege that
required no confidentiality. An earlier view of the privilege, evidence of which is present in
the Chahoon opinion, saw the privilege as a protector of the lawyer’s duty not to reveal client
secrets that resulted from the confidential relationship. See Chahoon v. Commonwealth, 62
Va. (21 Gratt.) 822, 838 (1871) (“‘If, touching matters that come within the ordinary scope of
professional employment, they receive a communication in their professional capacity, either
from a client or on his account, and for his benefit in the transaction of his business, or, which
amounts to the same thing, if they commit to paper, in the course of their employment on his
behalf, matters which they know only through their professional relation to the client, they
are not only justified in withholding such matters, but bound to withhold them, and will not
be compelled to disclose the information, or produce the papers, in any court of law or equity,
either as party or as witness.’” (quoting Greenough v. Gaskell, (1833) 39 Eng. Rep. 618 (Ch.)
620; 1 My. & K. 98, 102)). Under this older view of the privilege, since abandoned in the
United States, courts should not force a lawyer to breach that duty to the client and reveal the
secrets even if the information came from a source other than the client. With this theory, the
presence of third parties, when the communication between attorney and client occurred, was
irrelevant. See Melanie B. Leslie, The Costs of Confidentiality and the Purpose of Privilege,
2000 WIS. L. REV. 31, 47; Paul R. Rice, Attorney–Client Privilege: The Eroding Concept of
Confidentiality Should Be Abolished, 47 DUKE L.J. 853, 856 (1998) [hereinafter Rice, Eroding
Concept]; Paul R. Rice, A Bad Idea Dying Hard: A Reply to Professor Leslie’s Defense of the
Indefensible, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 187, 187–88 [hereinafter Rice, Bad Idea].
53. See infra Part II.D.
54. See, e.g., Chevron Corp. v. Kohn, Nos. 10-MC-208, 10-MC-209, 2010 WL 5173279, at
*7 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 20, 2010) (no privilege applies to conversations in presence of film crew);
HSH Nordbank AG N.Y. Branch v. Swerdlow, 259 F.R.D. 64, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“Although
communications between client and counsel relating to legal advice are generally privileged,
the privilege is waived where such communications are ‘made . . . in the known presence of a
third party.’” (alteration in original) (quoting People v. Osorio, 549 N.E.2d 1183, 1185 (N.Y.
1989))).
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communication with a third party waives the privilege because the
sharing shows a lack of intent that the communication continue to be
55
confidential.
Applying the attorney–client privilege in the allied
lawyer situation is inconsistent with this confidentiality requirement.
Finally, abolishing privilege for the allied lawyer situation does not
undo centuries of legal precedent. Rather, the application of privilege
56
to the allied lawyer situation is a creature of recent origin. Only four
57
cases applied the privilege to the allied lawyer setting before 1965.
Only in the last three decades have claims of privilege in the allied
58
lawyer situation become common and problematic. By abolishing the
privilege for the allied lawyer situation, courts would simply be making a
correction to a recently taken jurisprudential wrong turn.
II. THE ATTORNEY–CLIENT PRIVILEGE
A. The Modern Definition
The modern attorney–client privilege is the client’s privilege; the
59
client controls its assertion and waiver.
The privilege prevents
compelled disclosure of confidential communications that occur
between an attorney and a client if the purpose of the communication is
60
to obtain or render legal advice and if the communication is not in
55. See, e.g., WebXchange Inc. v. Dell Inc., 264 F.R.D. 123, 126 (D. Del. 2010) (“[I]f a
client shares an otherwise privileged communication with a third party, then the
communication is no longer confidential and the client has waived the privilege.”); see also
Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., No. 5:07-cv-03783 JF (PVT), 2010 WL 4789099, at *1 (N.D.
Cal. Nov. 17, 2010) (holding that the privilege was waived after client disclosed conversations
with lawyer on blogs and otherwise).
56. See infra Part III.C.
57. See cases cited infra note 320.
58. See infra Part III.C for a discussion about the recent explosion of cases where the
privilege has been claimed in the allied lawyer setting.
59. See Sandra T.E. v. S. Berwyn Sch. Dist. 100, 600 F.3d 612, 618 (7th Cir. 2010) (“The
privilege belongs to the client, although an attorney may assert the privilege on the client’s
behalf.”); In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“The attorney–
client privilege belongs to the client, who alone may waive it.”); Lord Say & Seal’s Case,
(1721) 88 Eng. Rep. 617, 617 (K.B.); 10 Mod. 45 (court held that privilege was not attorney’s
but client’s); see also RICE, supra note 19, § 9:1.
60. WebXchange, 264 F.R.D. at 126 (“The attorney–client privilege protects from
compelled disclosure ‘any communication that satisfies the following elements: it must be (1)
a communication (2) made between privileged persons (3) in confidence (4) for the purpose
of obtaining or providing legal assistance for the client.’” (quoting In re Teleglobe Commc’ns
Corp., 493 F.3d 345, 359 (3d Cir. 2007))); see also 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN
TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2292, at 554 (1961).
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61

furtherance of a crime or fraud. The protection of the privilege ends if
62
the client waives it.
An often-quoted definition of the modern
attorney–client privilege was stated by Judge Wyzanski in United States
63
v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.:
(1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a
client; (2) the person to whom the communication was made (a)
is a member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in
connection with this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the
communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was
informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of strangers
(c) for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion on
law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal
proceeding, and not (d) for the purpose of committing a crime or
tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a) claimed and (b) not
64
waived by the client.
61. See In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., 479 F.3d 1078, 1090 (9th Cir. 2007) (“‘The
privilege takes flight if the relation is abused. A client who consults an attorney for advice
that will serve him in the commission of a fraud will have no help from the law. He must let
the truth be told.’” (quoting Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933))).
62. The privilege can be expressly or impliedly waived, and the waiver can take many
forms. For example, the privilege can be waived by not taking reasonable precautions to
protect the confidentiality of the communications. See, e.g., In re Victor, 422 F. Supp. 475, 476
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) (leaving papers in public hallway destroyed the privilege). The privilege may
be waived by disclosure. See, e.g., United States v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d 681, 685 (1st
Cir. 1997). The privilege may be waived by the client making the communications a
substantive issue; for example, by relying on the advice of counsel as a defense. See, e.g.,
Glenmede Trust Co. v. Thompson, 56 F.3d 476, 478–79 (3d Cir. 1995); see also RICE, supra
note 19, § 9:23.
63. 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950).
64. Id. at 358–59; see also United States v. Tedder, 801 F.2d 1437, 1442 (4th Cir. 1986)
(quoting United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. at 358–59); Gucci Am., Inc. v. Guess?, Inc.,
No. 09 Civ. 4373(SAS), 2011 WL 9375, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2011) (quoting United Shoe
Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. at 358–59).
Some states have codified the privilege. For example, a New York statute states in
pertinent part:
Unless the client waives the privilege, an attorney or his employee, or any person
who obtains without the knowledge of the client evidence of a confidential
communication made between the attorney or his employee and the client in the
course of professional employment, shall not disclose, or be allowed to disclose such
communication, nor shall the client be compelled to disclose such communication,
in any action, disciplinary trial or hearing, or administrative action, proceeding or
hearing conducted by or on behalf of any state, municipal or local governmental
agency or by the legislature or any committee or body thereof. Evidence of any

08-GIESEL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2011–2012]

3/20/2012 2:05 PM

END THE EXPERIMENT

491

The party claiming the protection of the privilege has the burden of
65
proving that it applies to the particular communication. Courts require
the opponent to the claimant of the privilege to prove a prima facie case
66
of waiver. Then, the claimant of the privilege must rebut the prima
67
facie case to successfully claim the privilege.

such communication obtained by any such person, and evidence resulting
therefrom, shall not be disclosed by any state, municipal or local governmental
agency or by the legislature or any committee or body thereof. The relationship of
an attorney and client shall exist between a professional service corporation
organized under article fifteen of the business corporation law to practice as an
attorney and counselor-at-law and the clients to whom it renders legal services.
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4503(a) (McKinney 1992); see also KY. R. EVID. § 503(b) (“A client has a
privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing a confidential
communication made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal
services to the client: (1) Between the client or a representative of the client and the client's
lawyer or a representative of the lawyer; (2) Between the lawyer and a representative of the
lawyer; (3) By the client or a representative of the client or the client’s lawyer or a
representative of the lawyer representing another party in a pending action and concerning a
matter of common interest therein; (4) Between representatives of the client or between the
client and a representative of the client; or (5) Among lawyers and their representatives
representing the same client.”).
65. See Solidus Networks, Inc. v. Excel Innovations, Inc., 502 F.3d 1086, 1099 (9th Cir.
2007); Mass. Eye & Ear Infirmary v. QLT Phototherapeutics, Inc., 412 F.3d 215, 225–26 (1st
Cir. 2005).
66. See First Fed. Sav. Bank of Hegewisch v. United States, 55 Fed. Cl. 263, 267 (2003)
(“The party asserting the privilege has the initial burden of establishing the elements of the
privilege. Once this showing is made, the burden shifts to the party opposing the privilege to
establish a prima facie case of waiver. . . . Next, the burden shifts back to the party asserting
the privilege ‘to rebut the prima facie case by demonstrating that the privilege is still viable.’
Therefore, in sum, plaintiff[s] must not only establish that the privilege applied, but also that
the privilege was not waived.” (footnotes omitted)).
67. Similarly, when a party claims that the privilege does not apply because the
communication was in furtherance of a crime or fraud, the privilege claimant has the burden
of proving that the privilege applies and then the opponent must show that the claim of crime
or fraud has some basis in fact. See Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933); see also
United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 562–63, 568 (1989). Exactly what must be shown is
unclear. For example, in In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., 479 F.3d 1078, 1094–95 (9th Cir.
2007), a civil matter, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that the burden should be a
preponderance of the evidence. In In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 867 F.2d 539, 541 (9th Cir.
1989), a criminal matter, the court required proof of “reasonable cause to believe” that the
communication was in furtherance of a crime or fraud. See, e.g., Cary Bricker, Revisiting the
Crime-Fraud Exception to the Attorney–Client Privilege: A Proposal to Remedy the Disparity
in Protections for Civil and Criminal Privilege Holders, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 149, 155 (2009).
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B. The Modern Rationale for the Privilege
68

In Upjohn Co. v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court discussed
the purpose of the modern rationale of the attorney–client privilege:
[The] purpose [of the privilege] is to encourage full and frank
communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby
promote broader public interests in the observance of law and
[the] administration of justice. The privilege recognizes that
sound legal advice or advocacy serves public ends and that such
advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyer’s being fully
69
informed by the client.
68. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
69. Id. at 389; see also Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599, 606 (2009) (“By
assuring confidentiality, the privilege encourages clients to make ‘full and frank’ disclosures
to their attorneys, who are then better able to provide candid advice and effective
representation. This, in turn, serves broader public interests in the observance of law and
administration of justice.” (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981)));
Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 403 (1998) (“The privilege is intended to
encourage ‘full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby
promote broader public interests in the observance of law and the administration of justice.’”
(quoting Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389)); Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 11 (1996) (“Our cases
make clear that an asserted privilege must also ‘serv[e] public ends.’ Thus, the purpose of the
attorney–client privilege is to ‘encourage full and frank communication between attorneys
and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and
administration of justice.’” (quoting Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389)); Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S.
464, 470 (1888) (“The rule which places the seal of secrecy upon communications between
client and attorney is founded upon the necessity, in the interest and administration of justice,
of the aid of persons having knowledge of the law and skilled in its practice, which assistance
can only be safely and readily availed of when free from the consequences or the
apprehension of disclosure.”); Castellani v. Scranton Times, L.P., 956 A.2d 937, 951 (Pa.
2008) (“The attorney–client privilege, on the other hand, renders an attorney incompetent to
testify as to communications made to him by his client in order to promote a free flow of
information only between attorney and his or her client so that the attorney can better
represent the client.”).
In an early statement of this rationale, an English court stated,
No man can conduct any of his affairs which relate to matters of law, without
employing and consulting with an attorney; even if he is capable of doing it in point
of skill, the law will not let him; and if he does not fully and candidly disclose every
thing that is in his mind, which he apprehends may be in the least relative to the
affair he consults his attorney upon, it will be impossible for the attorney properly
to serve him . . . .
Annesley v. Anglesea, (1743) 17 How. St. Tr. 1139 (Exch.) 1237 (Ir.). For a discussion of this
case, see Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., An Historical Perspective on the Attorney–Client Privilege,
66 CALIF. L. REV. 1061, 1073–80 (1978). The Annesley case involved the ownership of certain
property. Id. at 1073–74. One of the claimants was the brother of a deceased earl who
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The theory is that clients need the fully-informed advice of their
attorneys so that they can determine how to proceed in accordance with
70
the law. By proceeding in accordance with the law, the administration
71
of justice, on a global measure, improves.
72
As so stated, this rationale is utilitarian. It has several premises.
claimed that he inherited the earldom and the property rightfully from his childless brother.
Id. at 1074. The other claimant claimed to be the legitimate son of the deceased earl. Id. He
claimed that his wicked step-mother gave him away and that his uncle, knowing of his
identity, sought to have him wrongfully prosecuted and hanged for a murder he did not
commit. Id. The claimed privileged communications were communications between the
uncle and his attorney in which the uncle sought the attorney’s help in arranging for the
prosecution. Id. Ultimately, the court recognized the privilege generally but did not apply it
on these facts. Id. at 1078; see Annesley, 17 How. St. Tr., at 1242.
Commentators have suggested deontological justifications, such as the notion that the
client’s privacy interest in the communication justified the privilege or the notion that respect
for the client’s autonomy justifies the privilege. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Preservation of
a Client’s Confidences: One Value Among Many or a Categorical Imperative?, 52 U. COLO. L.
REV. 349, 350 (1981); David W. Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusion:
Privileges in Federal Court Today, 31 TUL. L. REV. 101, 112–13 (1956).
70. See Hunt, 128 U.S. at 470 (1888) (finding that the privilege facilitates the
“administration of justice”). In United States v. Upjohn Co., the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals refused to apply the attorney–client privilege to communications between the
corporation’s counsel and employees who were not in the control group of the corporation.
600 F.2d 1223, 1227–28 (1979). On review, the Supreme Court noted:
The narrow scope given the attorney–client privilege by the court below not only
makes it difficult for corporate attorneys to formulate sound advice when their
client is faced with a specific legal problem but also threatens to limit the valuable
efforts of corporate counsel to ensure their client’s compliance with the law.
Upjohn, 383 U.S. at 392.
71. In its Upjohn decision, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals stated, “This policy of
promoting full disclosure to counsel serves to implement the notion inherent in the first
principle, that finding the truth and achieving justice in an adversary system are best served
by fully-informed advocates loyal to their client's interests.” 600 F.2d at 1226 (citing Fisher v.
United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976)); see also In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360,
1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“[W]e are guided by [the attorney–client privilege’s] purpose ‘to
encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby
promote broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of justice.’ The
privilege also ‘recognizes that sound legal advice or advocacy serves public ends and that such
advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyer’s being fully informed by the client.’” (quoting
Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389)).
72. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 87, at 387 (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 6th ed. 2006); 2
CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 5:13, at 520
(3d ed. 2007 & Supp. 2011); Note, Attorney–Client and Work Product Protection in a
Utilitarian World: An Argument for Recomparison, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1697, 1703–04 (1995);
see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68 cmt. c (2000).
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One premise is that clients will not be completely forthcoming with
information when consulting an attorney unless they are certain that a
73
court cannot compel disclosure of their communications with counsel.
Another premise of the rationale is that complete client disclosure yields
74
superior legal advice. And a third premise is that superior legal advice
75
will lead clients to observe and obey the law.
C. Before the Modern Definition and the Modern Rationale
In the sixteenth century, the attorney–client privilege was not a
client’s privilege as it is now. Rather, the privilege was a legal advisor’s
76
privilege. The privilege developed in reaction to the Statute Against
73. In Swidler & Berlin v. United States, the Supreme Court, in deciding whether the
attorney–client privilege survived the death of a client, stated, “In the case at hand, it seems
quite plausible that [the client], perhaps already contemplating suicide, may not have sought
legal advice from [the lawyer] if he had not been assured the conversation was privileged.”
524 U.S. at 408 (1998).
74. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389 (“The privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or
advocacy serves public ends and that such advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyer’s
being fully informed by the client.”).
75. Some commentators question the assumptions and the effect the privilege is thought
to have. See, e.g., Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Historical Cycle in the Law of Evidentiary
Privileges: Will Instrumentalism Come into Conflict with the Modern Humanistic Theories?, 55
ARK. L. REV. 241, 243–44 (2002); Lloyd B. Snyder, Is Attorney–Client Confidentiality
Necessary?, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 477, 485 (2002). Empirical evidence does not shed
much light on the issue. See Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 409 n.4, in which the Supreme
Court stated,
Empirical evidence on the privilege is limited. Three studies do not reach firm
conclusions on whether limiting the privilege would discourage full and frank
communication. [Vincent C.] Alexander, The Corporate Attorney Client Privilege:
A Study of the Participants, 63 St. John’s L. Rev. 191 (1989); [Fred C.] Zacharias,
Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 Iowa L. Rev. 352 (1989); Comment, Functional
Overlap Between the Lawyer and Other Professionals: Its Implications for the
Privileged Communications Doctrine, 71 Yale L.J. 1226 (1962). These articles note
that clients are often uninformed or mistaken about the privilege, but suggest that a
substantial number of clients and attorneys think the privilege encourages candor.
Two of the articles conclude that a substantial number of clients and attorneys think
the privilege enhances open communication, Alexander, supra, at 244–46, 261, and
that the absence of a privilege would be detrimental to such communication,
Comment, 71 Yale L.J., supra, at 1236. The third article suggests instead that while
the privilege is perceived as important to open communication, limited exceptions
to the privilege might not discourage such communication, Zacharias, supra, at 382,
386.
76. See RICE, supra note 19, § 1:2; see also WIGMORE, supra note 60, § 2290, at 544 (the
privilege did not belong to the client because “[t]he pledge of secrecy had not been taken by
him, and therefore the ‘point of honor’ was not his to make”). A privilege of sorts for the
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77

Perjury, enacted in the 1560s. The Statute Against Perjury provided
78
that witnesses could be compelled to testify in court. At that time,
79
parties to a matter were not viewed as competent to testify. The next
best thing to testimony from the parties was testimony from the legal
advisors of the parties about what the parties told their legal advisors.
The legal advisor privilege developed to protect legal advisors from
80
having to testify against their clients.
This privilege also protected the honor of the legal advisor by
preventing a court from compelling the advisor to disclose the client’s
81
secrets learned in the confidential relationship of attorney and client.
The premise of the privilege was that the legal advisor owed the client a
82
duty of secrecy and should not be compelled to violate this duty.
Interestingly, the privilege applied regardless of the confidentiality of
83
the communication at issue. The goal was to protect the legal advisor
legal advisor may have existed in Roman times as well. For example, Professor Max Radin,
writing in the 1920s, notes that when Cicero was prosecuting the Roman governor of Sicily, he
commented that he could not summon the governor’s patronus (advisor). See Max Radin,
The Privilege of Confidential Communication Between Lawyer and Client, 16 CALIF. L. REV.
487, 488 (1928).
77. 5 Eliz. I, c.9, § 6 (1562–3) (Eng.), cited in RICE, supra note 19, § 1:2.
78. 5 Eliz. I, c.9, § 6 (1562–3) (Eng.), cited in RICE, supra note 19, § 1:2.
79. See R. v. Inhabitants of Woburn, (1808) 103 Eng. Rep. 825 (K.B.); 10 East 395; see
also Hazard, supra note 69, at 1082–83.
80. See, e.g., Hartford v. Lee, (1603) 21 Eng. Rep. 34 (1603); Cary 63 (the court excused
a solicitor from a subpoena to testify because he was a solicitor in the matter).
81. See, e.g., Andrews v. Solomon, 1 F. Cas. 899, 900 (C.C.D. Pa. 1816) (No. 378) (“An
attorney is not permitted to disclose as a witness, the secrets of his client, because in doing so,
he would betray a confidence, which from necessity the client must repose in him.”); Creed v.
Trap, (1578–1579) 21 Eng. Rep. 74 (Ch.) 74 (stating that the legal advisor “shall not be
examined upon any Interrogatories which shall compel him to discover any matter which
came to his knowledge as a Solicitor or as of a Councel in this case”).
82. Professor Max Radin explained that some lawyers were gentlemen and hypothesized
that “the common obligation of gentlemen not to betray a confidence reposed in them” was
the original basis of the privilege. See Radin, supra note 76, at 487. Attorneys and solicitors
were more like servants and servants also had a duty to “keep his master’s secrets.” See id.;
see also RICE, supra note 19, §§ 1:3, 1:5; WIGMORE, supra note 60, § 2291, at 553 (stating that
it would be “repugnant to any honorable man to feel that the confidences which his relation
naturally invites are liable at the opponent’s behest to be laid open through his own
testimony,” which creates a “disagreeable inconsistency of being at the same time the solicitor
and the revealer of the secrets,” which “double-minded attitude would create an unhealthy
moral state in the practitioner”).
83. See Leslie, supra note 52, at 48 (“Given this justification for the privilege,
confidentiality was entirely irrelevant—the aim was to shelter the attorney from being forced
to testify against his client and violate his trust. The presence of a third party did not make
the lawyer’s trust any less sacred.”).
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from being the source of disclosure of the client’s secrets. A secret was
information told to the lawyer in the confidential relationship regardless
of whether the client shared the information with others before or after
84
talking with the legal advisor. If a client communicated to the legal
advisor in the presence of a third party, the legal advisor privilege
applied so that the advisor could not be compelled to disclose what the
85
client had disclosed to the advisor.
The third party could testify,
86
however, so there was a disincentive to sharing information with
others.
In the 1700s and 1800s, some courts embraced the view that the
87
privilege belonged to clients, not legal advisors. Some courts began
considering the privilege as justified by the modern utilitarian
88
rationale, though other courts of that time continued to view the
84. The privilege might apply even if the client’s secret comes from a source other than
the client. See Greenough v. Gaskell, (1833) 39 Eng. Rep. 618 (Ch.), which states,
If touching matters that come within the ordinary scope of professional
employment, they receive a communication in their professional capacity, either
from a client, or on his account, and for his benefit in the transaction of his business,
or, which amounts to the same thing, if they commit to paper, in the course of their
employment on his behalf, matters which they know only through their professional
relation to the client, they are not only justified in withholding such matters, but
bound to withhold them, and will not be compelled to disclose the information or
produce the papers in any Court of law or equity, either as party or as witness.
Id. at 620.
85. See, e.g., Hoy v. Morris, 79 Mass. (13 Gray) 519, 521 (1859) (stating that, though a
third party overheard an attorney–client communication, the attorney could not testify
because the privilege applied).
86. For example, in Hoy, the court stated that a third party, who overheard an attorney–
client communication, could testify though the attorney could not. Id.; see also Goddard v.
Gardner, 28 Conn. 172, 175 (1859) (“The rule which enjoins the attorney's silence does not
extend to such a witness, and the court below erred in refusing to hear his testimony.”).
87. See RICE, supra note 19, § 1:3. For two examples, see Baker v. Arnold, 1 Cai. R. 258,
266 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1803) (holding the privilege is the client’s); and Lord Say & Seal’s Case,
(1721) 88 Eng. Rep. 617 (K.B.) (stating that “[t]he Court were of opinion . . . that an
attorney’s privilege was the privilege of his client”).
88. See, e.g., Annesley v. Anglesea, (1743) 17 How. St. Tr. 1139 (Exch.) 1237 (Ir.) (“No
man can conduct any of his affairs which relate to matters of law, without employing and
consulting with an attorney; even if he is capable of doing it in point of skill, the law will not
let him; and if he does not fully and candidly disclose every thing that is in his mind, which he
apprehends may be in the least relative to the affair he consults his attorney upon, it will be
impossible for the attorney properly to serve him . . . .”). For a discussion of the case, see
Hazard, supra note 69, at 1073 (“This case reads like a source material for a Dickens novel—
indeed, its facts make David Copperfield seem a pale contrivance.”). Professor Melanie
Leslie has noted that the two rationales “co-existed for some time, with the result that the
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89

privilege as belonging to the legal advisor. Eventually, the modern rule
90
and rationale became the universally accepted rule.
D. The Confidentiality Requirement
Today, any definition of the modern attorney–client privilege
includes a requirement that the communication be confidential at its
91
inception. In addition, the communication must be kept confidential
92
for the communication to continue to be protected by the privilege.
93
The confidentiality mandate is not absolute, but it does require that the

details of the attorney–client privilege, including the existence of a confidentiality
requirement, remained muddled through the nineteenth century.” See Leslie, supra note 52,
at 49.
89. See, e.g., Preston v. Carr, (1826) 148 Eng. Rep. 634 (Exch.) 635. In the case, the
Chief Baron stated, “I cannot accede to the proposition . . . that the privilege of an attorney is
the privilege of the client.” Id.
90. See Imwinkelried, supra note 75, at 249 (stating that the modern rule and rationale
became the “dominant paradigm”).
91. See WebXchange Inc. v. Dell Inc., 264 F.R.D. 123, 126 (D. Del. 2010) (“A
communication is not made in confidence, and in turn is not privileged, if persons other than
the client, its attorney, or their agents are present. Similarly, if a client shares an otherwise
privileged communication with a third party, then the communication is no longer
confidential and the client has waived the privilege.” (citation omitted) (citing In re Teleglobe
Commc’ns Corp., 493 F.3d 345, 361 (3d Cir. 2007))).
92. See, e.g., In re Qwest Commc’ns Int’l Inc., 450 F.3d 1179, 1185 (10th Cir. 2006)
(stating the privilege will only be recognized when “the communication between the client
and the attorney is made in confidence of the relationship and under circumstances from
which it may reasonably be assumed that the communication will remain in confidence”); see
also Rice, Eroding Concept, supra note 52, at 856–57.
93. There are situations in which communications are disclosed and yet the
communication does not lose the protection of the privilege. For example, an inadvertent
disclosure may result in opposing counsel viewing a privileged document, yet the court may
determine that the client has not waived the privilege. See, e.g., Ergo Licensing, LLC v.
Carefusion 303, Inc., 263 F.R.D. 40, 46–47 (D. Me. 2009) (finding no waiver in a disclosure of
thirty-one privileged documents in a group of 540 documents produced in response to a
discovery request and stating that “[w]hether a waiver of the attorney–client privilege is
accomplished by the inadvertent disclosure of documents is evaluated by a three-element test:
‘1) the disclosure must be inadvertent; 2) the holder of the privilege or protection took
reasonable steps to prevent the disclosure; and 3) the holder promptly took steps to rectify
the error’” (quoting Rhoades v. Young Women’s Christian Ass’n of Greater Pitt., Civil
Action No. 09-261, 2009 WL 3319820, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 14, 2009))); Nova Se. Univ., Inc. v.
Jacobson, 25 So. 3d 82, 85 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (applying a five-part test that considered
“1) the reasonableness of the precautions taken to prevent inadvertent disclosure; 2) the
number of inadvertent disclosures; 3) the extent of the disclosure; 4) the delay in measures
taken to rectify the inadvertent disclosures; and 5) whether overriding interests of justice will
be served by relieving the party of its error” in concluding that letter found on the office fax
machine was protected by the attorney–client privilege (citing Gen. Motors Corp. v. McGee,

08-GIESEL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

498

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

3/20/2012 2:05 PM

[95:475

client reasonably and honestly believe the communication to be
94
between the client and the attorney only. Courts view the presence at
the time of the communication of third parties who are not agents of the
attorney or the client as an indication that the client had no intention

837 So. 2d 1010, 1040 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002))); Diehl v. Fred Weber, Inc., 309 S.W.3d 309,
324–25 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that privileged was maintained when a two-page email
was disclosed due to clerical error after the parties had agreed to return inadvertently
disclosed documents, reasonable precautions had been taken to prevent the disclosure, the
disclosure was “minimal,” and the discloser acted promptly to have the document returned).
Federal Rule of Evidence 502, which became effective in 2008, states in part,
The following provisions apply, in the circumstances set out, to disclosure of a
communication or information covered by the attorney–client privilege or workproduct protection. . . .
....
(b) Inadvertent disclosure.—When made in a Federal proceeding or to a
Federal office or agency, the disclosure does not operate as a waiver in a Federal or
State proceeding if:
(1) the disclosure is inadvertent;
(2) the holder of the privilege or protection took reasonable steps to
prevent disclosure; and
(3) the holder promptly took reasonable steps to rectify the error,
including (if applicable) following Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(b)(5)(B).
FED. R. EVID. 502(b); see also Bd. of Trs., Sheet Metal Workers’ Nat’l Pension Fund v.
Palladium Equity Partners, LLC, 722 F. Supp. 2d 845, 849–51 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (applying
Federal Rule of Evidence 502 and finding that “the defendants took reasonable steps to
prevent disclosure during the . . . document production” requiring review of “63,025
documents totaling an estimated 4.7 million pages” and that “the defendants took prompt
steps to recall the documents once they realized that they had been disclosed”).
Also, the privilege applies to communications that are seized by a third party through
illegal means though the seizure usually means the communications have been disclosed to
third parties. See, e.g., Sackman v. Liggett Group, Inc., 173 F.R.D. 358, 365 (E.D.N.Y. 1997)
(excluding expert testimony based on a stolen document was excluded); State v. Today's
Bookstore, Inc., 621 N.E.2d 1283, 1288–89 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (holding that leaked
memorandum remained privileged); see also Parnes v. Parnes, 915 N.Y.S.2d 345, 348 (App.
Div. 2011) (finding that, although wife accessed husband’s e-mail without authorization, the
e-mail retained privilege protection).
94. See Tractenberg v. Twp. of W. Orange, 4 A.3d 585, 598 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2010) (“Confidential communications are only those ‘communications which the client either
expressly made confidential or which he could reasonably assume under the circumstances
would be understood by the attorney as so intended.’” (quoting State v. Schubert, 561 A.2d
1186, 1190 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989))); see also United States v. Blasco, 702 F.2d 1315,
1329 (11th Cir. 1983) (talking loudly in a hallway does not indicate an intention that the
statement be confidential).
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95

that the communication be confidential. Thus, the communication is
not protected by the privilege.
If the client later shares the
communication with a third party, the courts view the sharing as an
96
indication that confidentiality is no longer important.
Thus, the
communication is no longer protected by the privilege even though it
may have been privileged before the act of sharing.
This confidentiality requirement became a part of privilege law late
97
in the nineteenth century. It acts not as a requirement that furthers the
rationale of the attorney–client privilege but rather as a necessary limit
98
on the privilege’s scope. The privilege acts to encourage a client to
fully disclose information to the lawyer.
The rationale of the
confidentiality requirement is that if a client does not care about the
confidential nature of a communication, the client will readily disclose
95. See WebXchange, 264 F.R.D. at 126 (“A communication is not made in confidence,
and in turn is not privileged, if persons other than the client, its attorney, or their agents are
present.”); In re Condemnation City of Phila., 981 A.2d 391, 397 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2009)
(“Confidentiality is key to the privilege, and the presence of a third-party during attorney–
client communications will generally negate the privilege; presumably, the client does not
intend communications to be confidential if they are heard by someone else.”); see also
Chevron Corp. v. Kohn, Nos. 10-MC-208, 10-MC-209, 2010 WL 5173279, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Dec.
20, 2010) (no privilege applies because a film crew was present); Curry v. McNeil, No.
4:07cv351-SPM/WCS, 2008 WL 5157516, *5, *9–10 (N.D. Fla. Dec. 9, 2008) (the attorney–
client privilege did not apply to a telephone conversation between attorney and client because
the client’s girlfriend was also on the call).
96. See United States v. Ary, 518 F.3d 775, 782 (10th Cir. 2008) (“Because confidentiality
is critical to the privilege, it will be ‘lost if the client discloses the substance of an otherwise
privileged communication to a third party.’” (quoting In re Qwest Commc’ns Int’l Inc., 450
F.3d 1179, 1185 (10th Cir. 2006))); WebXchange, 264 F.R.D. at 126 (“Similarly, if a client
shares an otherwise privileged communication with a third party, then the communication is
no longer confidential and the client has waived the privilege.”); Wildearth Guardians v. U.S.
Forest Serv., 713 F. Supp. 2d 1243, 1265 (D. Colo. 2010) (“Only confidential information is
protected by the privilege; if the information has been or is later shared with third parties, the
privilege does not apply.”); see also Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., No. 5:07-cv-03783 JF
(PVT), 2010 WL 4789099, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2010) (discussing how the client disclosed
conversations she had with her attorney on blogs and otherwise and finding waiver); Bower v.
Weisman, 669 F. Supp. 602, 605–06 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding there was no confidentiality
where client left letter open on a table in a room in a suite where a third party was staying); In
re Victor, 422 F. Supp. 475, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (“By placing the documents in the public
hallway outside of Mr. Victor’s office, the privilege which might have theretofore existed with
respect to these papers was totally destroyed.”).
97. See RICE, supra note 19, § 6:3. Professor Rice credits Professor Wigmore and his
treatise for the general acceptance of the confidentiality requirement. See Rice, Bad Idea,
supra note 52, at 188 (“The change in the concept of confidentiality was brought about by
Professor Wigmore in his influential treatise.”).
98. See infra Part II.E for a discussion about the costs of the attorney–client privilege.
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all necessary information to the lawyer without the encouragement of
99
the privilege.
So, the confidentiality requirement ensures that the
privilege applies only where it is needed as an encouragement.
E. Inherent Costs of the Privilege
The attorney–client privilege does not create benefit without cost.
The cost of the privilege is the potential that applying the privilege in a
100
particular situation will keep relevant evidence from the truth-finder.
As Professor Wigmore stated, “[T]he privilege remains an exception to
the general duty to disclose. Its benefits are all indirect and speculative;
its obstruction is plain and concrete. . . . It is worth preserving for the
sake of a general policy, but it is nonetheless an obstacle to the
101
investigation of the truth.”
99. See WIGMORE, supra note 60, § 2311, at 599 (“The reason for prohibiting disclosure
. . . ceases when the client does not appear to have been desirous of secrecy.”); see also Leslie,
supra note 52, at 33 (“While the attorney–client privilege seeks to encourage client
confidences, the confidentiality requirement exists to limit the exclusion of reliable evidence
by ensuring that the privilege applies to only those statements that would not have been made
absent the privilege.”). Professor Paul Rice argues that the confidentiality requirement
should be abolished because it is valueless. He posits that, whether or not a communication is
confidential, the client may value having the communication protected from compelled
disclosure. In other words, the client may not care who knows what he told his counsel, but
he would not want that information used against him in a court of law. See Rice, Eroding
Concept, supra note 52, at 861 (“Confidentiality, therefore, should be abandoned as a
requirement for the attorney–client privilege because compliance with it generates significant
unnecessary costs in the preservation of the secrecy, the proof of that preservation, and the
resolution of disputes surrounding it.”); see also Rice, Bad Idea, supra note 52, at 189.
100. See United States v. Aramony, 88 F.3d 1369, 1389 (4th Cir. 1996) (“But the
attorney–client privilege interferes with the truthseeking mission of the legal process, because
it is in derogation of the public’s right to every man’s evidence. Thus, the privilege is not
favored by federal courts and is to be strictly confined within the narrowest possible limits
consistent with the logic of its principle.” (citations and internal quotations omitted));
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Phil., 951 F.2d 1414, 1423 (3d Cir. 1991) (stating
that the attorney–client privilege is narrowly construed because it “obstructs the truth-finding
process”); Jones v. Murphy, 256 F.R.D. 510, 512 (D. Md. 2008) (“The privilege is ‘not favored
by the federal courts’ because it interferes with the truth seeking process and contravenes the
right of citizens to evidence, and should be ‘strictly confined within the narrowest possible
limits consistent with the logic of its principle.’” (quoting In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 727
F.2d 1352, 1355 (4th Cir. 1984))); see also MCCORMICK, supra note 72, § 72, at 339 (“Their
effect instead is clearly inhibitive; rather than facilitating the illumination of truth, they shut
out the light.”).
101. WIGMORE, supra note 60, § 2291, at 554. The courts over the years often have
quoted Wigmore’s statement of the costs of the privilege. See, e.g., NLRB v. Harvey, 349
F.2d 900, 907 (4th Cir. 1965); Peralta v. Cendant Corp., 190 F.R.D. 38, 41 (D. Conn. 1999);
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Super. Ct., 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 186, 191 n.5 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)
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This cost is minimized by the fact that the privilege places
communications between client and lawyer beyond the reach of
compelled disclosure but does not protect the facts underlying the
102
communications.
Also, it is possible that no communication would
exist without the privilege so there would be no communication kept
103
from the truth-finder.
The courts’ acceptance of the absolute protection of the privilege
104
along with codification by some jurisdictions indicates a collective
conclusion that the privilege not only creates benefits but the benefits
105
also exceed any cost of its application. Yet, in applying the privilege in

(quoting Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1162 (D.S.C. 1975)); see
also John E. Sexton, A Post-Upjohn Consideration of Corporate Attorney–Client Privilege, 57
N.Y.U. L. REV. 443, 446 (1982) (“Notwithstanding the interests that the attorney–client
privilege purports to serve, even its staunchest proponents concede that, whenever the
privilege is invoked, otherwise relevant and admissible evidence may be suppressed.
Inherently, the attorney–client privilege, like all privileges, potentially hinders the
administration of justice.”).
102. The Supreme Court explained this in Upjohn Co. v. United States:
[T]he protection of the privilege extends only to communications and not to
facts. A fact is one thing and a communication concerning that fact is an
entirely different thing. The client cannot be compelled to answer the
question, ‘What did you say or write to the attorney?’ but may not refuse to
disclose any relevant fact within his knowledge merely because he
incorporated a statement of such fact into his communication to his attorney.
449 U.S. 383, 395–96 (1981) (alteration in original) (quoting City of Phila. v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 205 F. Supp. 830, 831 (E.D. Pa. 1962)); see also Robert Allen Sedler & Joseph J.
Simeone, The Realities of Attorney–Client Confidences, 24 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 9 (1963). But see
Alexander, supra note 75, at 228–31.
103. In Swidler & Berlin v. United States, the Supreme Court stated,
In related cases, we have said that the loss of evidence admittedly caused by the
privilege is justified in part by the fact that without the privilege, the client may not
have made such communications in the first place. This is true of disclosure before
and after the client’s death. Without assurance of the privilege's posthumous
application, the client may very well not have made disclosures to his attorney at all,
so the loss of evidence is more apparent than real.
524 U.S. 399, 408 (1998) (footnotes omitted); see also Leslie, supra note 52, at 31 (“In a
perfect world, then, the privilege would protect only reliable statements that would not
otherwise have been made.”).
104. See, e.g., ARK. R. EVID. 502; KY. R. EVID. 503; TEX. R. EVID. 503; see also supra
note 34 and accompanying discussion.
105. See Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 32 F.3d 851, 862 (3d Cir. 1994)
(“The privilege encourages the client to reveal to the lawyer confidences necessary for the
lawyer to provide advice and representation. As the privilege serves the interests of justice, it
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individual cases, courts continue to concern themselves with the damage
to the truth-finding mission of the judicial system. Courts often repeat a
refrain that the privilege must be “strictly confined within the narrowest
106
possible limits consistent with the logic of its principle.” Any desire to
apply the privilege narrowly always must be considered in light of the
counterweight of the general acceptance of the privilege. The United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey recently addressed
this tension in Louisiana Municipal Police Employees Retirement System
107
v. Sealed Air Corp.:
While it is true that the attorney–client privilege is narrowly
construed because it “obstructs the truth-finding process,” the
privilege is not “disfavored.” Courts should be cautious in their
application of the privilege mindful that “it protects only those
disclosures necessary to obtain informed legal advice which
might not have been made absent the privilege.” In all
instances, the facts underlying any given communication remain
108
discoverable.
F. The Certainty Imperative
The attorney–client privilege can achieve its desired goals only if it is
applied in an atmosphere of general certainty. The privilege encourages
a client to be completely honest and forthcoming with his or her lawyer
only if the client can determine before the opportunity for

is worthy of maximum legal protection.” (citations omitted)); see also In re Teleglobe
Commc’ns Corp., 493 F.3d 345, 361 n.13 (3d Cir. 2007) (the privilege is not “disfavored”).
106. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 604 F.2d 798, 802–03 (3d Cir. 1979); see also Clarke v.
Am. Commerce Nat’l Bank, 974 F.2d 127, 129 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Because the attorney–client
privilege has the effect of withholding relevant information from the factfinder, it is applied
only when necessary to achieve its limited purpose of encouraging full and frank disclosure by
the client to his or her attorney.”); Harrisburg Auth. v. CIT Capital USA, Inc., 716 F.
Supp. 2d 380, 387 (M.D. Pa. 2010) (“‘It is well established that evidentiary privileges . . . are
generally disfavored and should be narrowly construed.’ The attorney client privilege is one
such evidentiary privilege.” (quoting Pa. Dep’t of Transp. v. Taylor, 841 A.2d 108, 118 (Pa.
2004) (Nigro, J., dissenting))); Sieger v. Zak, 874 N.Y.S.2d 535, 537 (App. Div. 2009) (holding
that the privilege “constitutes an obstacle to the truth-finding process,” and it therefore “must
be narrowly construed, and its application must be consistent with the purposes underlying
the immunity” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
107. 253 F.R.D. 300 (D.N.J. 2008).
108. Id. at 305 (quoting, in order, Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Phil., 951
F.2d 1414, 1423 (3d Cir. 1991); Teleglobe Commc’ns Corp., 493 F.3d at 361 n.13; Fisher v.
United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976)).
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communication that the privilege will protect the communication from
court-ordered disclosure. As the Supreme Court stated in Upjohn,
[I]f the purpose of the attorney–client privilege is to be served,
the attorney and client must be able to predict with some degree
of certainty whether particular discussions will be protected. An
uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain but
results in widely varying applications by the courts, is little better
109
than no privilege at all.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly counseled against holdings that
would injure the certainty of privilege, and the Court has heeded its own
110
warning. For example, in Swidler & Berlin v. United States, the Court
considered application of the attorney–client privilege after the death of
111
The government argued that while the privilege might
the client.
protect some information after the client’s death, the privilege should
not protect communications containing extremely valuable
112
information. The Court stated, “Balancing ex post the importance of
the information against client interests, even limited to criminal cases,
introduces substantial uncertainty into the privilege’s application. For
just that reason, we have rejected use of a balancing test in defining the
113
contours of the privilege.”

109. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981); see also Teleglobe Commc’ns
Corp., 493 F.3d at 360 (“It is essential that parties be able to determine in advance with a high
degree of certainty whether communications will be protected by the privilege.”); RhonePoulenc Rorer, 32 F.3d at 863 (“If we intend to serve the interests of justice by encouraging
consultation with counsel free from the apprehension of disclosure, then courts must work to
apply the privilege in ways that are predictable and certain. ‘An uncertain privilege—or one
which purports to be certain, but [results] in widely varying applications by the courts—is
little better than no privilege.’” (quoting In re Von Bulow, 828 F.2d 94, 100 (2d Cir. 1987)));
Hercules, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434 F. Supp. 136, 144 (D. Del. 1977) (“Only if the client is
assured that the information he relays in confidence, when seeking legal advice, will be
immune from discovery will he be encouraged to disclose fully all relevant information to his
attorney.”).
110. 524 U.S. 399 (1998).
111. Id. at 403.
112. Id. at 406.
113. Id. at 409; see also Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1996).
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III. THE ORIGINS OF RECOGNITION OF A PRIVILEGE IN THE ALLIED
LAWYER SETTING
A. In the Beginning: The Chahoon Case
The Virginia Supreme Court was the first court to apply a privilege
to an allied lawyer situation. In Chahoon v. Commonwealth, the court,
in a criminal matter involving indicted defendants, held that the
privilege applied to communications by a defendant to or in the
114
presence of a lawyer for one of the other defendants.
In Chahoon, three men—Mr. Sanxay, Mr. Sands, and Mr.
Chahoon—were indicted for a conspiracy to defraud the estate of
Solomon Haunstein and for forging a note of Mr. Haunstein that was
115
part of the conspiracy to defraud.
All three men met after the
indictment, along with Mr. Lyon, an attorney representing Mr. Sanxay,
116
and Mr. Gregory, an attorney representing Mr. Sands.
At Mr.
Chahoon’s trial, Mr. Sanxay testified about what Mr. Chahoon had said
117
at the meeting. Mr. Chahoon then sought to question Mr. Lyon about
118
But Mr. Lyon claimed that
what Mr. Chahoon said at the meeting.
“all that passed [at the meeting,] . . . pass[ed] under the seal of
professional confidence” and that he would not answer unless his client,
119
Mr. Sanxay, consented. The trial court refused to force the lawyer to
120
answer.
The Virginia Supreme Court began its discussion of the privilege by
establishing the basic rule of privilege and quoting a treatise of the era
as follows: “There is no rule of law better settled than ‘that a counsel,
solicitor or attorney shall not be permitted to divulge any matter which
121
has been communicated to him in professional confidence.’”
The
court then stated, “Now nothing can be more certain than that,
according to all the authorities on the subject, whatever either of the
counsel present heard, or saw, on the said occasion, concerning the
114. 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 822, 843 (1871).
115. Id. at 835. See also Sands v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 871 (1872), for a
related case dealing with the same facts.
116. Chahoon, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) at 835.
117. Id. at 836.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. (quoting 2 THOMAS STARKIE, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE AND DIGEST OF PROOFS, IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 395 (1826)).
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matter of the said charge, was a privileged communication, within the
122
meaning of the rule.”
By turning to the concept of joint clients, the Virginia Supreme
123
Court reached the conclusion that the conversation was privileged.
The court noted that the law recognizes that a lawyer could represent
two clients on a matter, and the court saw no difference in the situation
124
before it.
The court stated in reference to Mr. Lyon, Mr. Sanxay’s
attorney,
And can it make any difference in this case, that he was
employed as counsel alone by Sanxay? The parties were jointly
indicted for a conspiracy to commit a particular crime, and
severally indicted for forging and uttering the same paper. They
might have employed the same counsel, or they might have
employed different counsel as they did. But whether they did
the one thing or the other, the effect is the same, as to their right
of communication to each and all of the counsel, and as to the
125
privilege of such communication.
The court reinforced its conclusion that the allied lawyer situation
before it was the same for purposes of the privilege by noting, “the
counsel of each was in effect the counsel of all, though, for purposes of
126
convenience, he was employed and paid by his respective client.” So
in this court’s view, the attorneys present for the conversation
represented all three indicted individuals for purposes of the privilege.
Mr. Chahoon argued that Mr. Lyon’s client, Mr. Sanxay, waived the
privilege by testifying about Mr. Chahoon’s statements in the group
127
conversation. But the court stated that, in a joint client situation, the
consent of all clients must be obtained before privileged
128
communications lose their privileged status.
If all of the parties had
engaged Mr. Lyon as their attorney, all three parties would have to
129
consent to disclosure for the privilege to be waived. Because the court
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at 839–40.
Id. at 843.
Id. at 841.
Id.
Id. at 842.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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viewed the situation before it as the same as a joint client situation, the
same consent rule applied. Mr. Sands never consented to any
disclosure, so Mr. Sanxay’s actions in testifying could not waive the
130
privilege. The court then concluded that the lawyer’s testimony was
properly excluded, stating, “confidential communications from client to
counsel, during the existence of this relationship, and about a
131
professional matter, are privileged.”
In support of its holding, the court noted that “it was natural and
reasonable, if not necessary, that these parties, thus charged with the
same crimes, should meet together in consultation with their counsel,
communicate to the latter all that might be deemed proper for them to
132
know, and to make all necessary arrangements for the defence.”
Because the parties had a right to consult, the court concluded that the
133
consultative communications must be privileged.
The court stated,
134
“Otherwise what would such right of consultation be worth?”
As the first case to recognize that communications in an allied
lawyer situation can be privileged, this opinion must be analyzed
carefully.
As precedent, the opinion withers under rational
consideration.
First is the fact that the lower court refused to allow the lawyer, Mr.
Lyon, to testify, but the court allowed Mr. Sanxay to testify about the
same conversation involving the defendants and the lawyers. So, though
the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s refusal to allow
Mr. Lyons to testify, Mr. Sanxay’s testimony about the conversation was
admitted and there was no reversal on this basis. The court noted that,
even if the lower court erred in finding Mr. Lyon’s probable testimony
privileged, and thus even if the Virginia Supreme Court erred in
135
affirming that finding, Mr. Chahoon was not prejudiced.
So the
Virginia Supreme Court seemed to say that, even if its holding was
130. Id. The court stated that even if Mr. Sanxay could waive the privilege’s protection,
Mr. Sanxay’s testimony did not do that because it was at most a waiver by implication and an
unclear implication at best. The court stated, “An intention to release the privilege ought to
be expressed; or, if implied, the implication ought to be plain.” Id. at 843.
131. Id. at 843.
132. Id. at 839.
133. Id. at 842.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 844. The court noted that though Mr. Chahoon was found guilty, the term of
imprisonment was the least available and he was recommended to the governor for executive
clemency. Id.
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incorrect, it was of no import to the matter at hand. Unfortunately, it
has had import as precedent.
Second, the court mischaracterized the law preceding its opinion.
The court stated its conclusion that the privilege applied to the allied
lawyer setting using the phrase, “nothing can be more certain,” and
stating that all authorities agreed that the privilege applied to this
136
situation. The Chahoon court cited no case law and, in fact, no one
has discovered any case preceding Chahoon in which a court held that a
communication in an allied lawyer situation was privileged.
Third, the court’s analysis of the situation is flawed. The court’s
underlying assumptions about application of the attorney–client
privilege to the joint client situation were correct. The court’s error was
its conclusion that the allied lawyer situation before it was the same as a
joint client situation—that “the counsel of each was in effect the counsel
of all, though, for purposes of convenience, he was employed and paid
137
by his respective client.” Contrary to the Chahoon court’s statement,
parties engage separate attorneys for reasons other than “purposes of
138
convenience.” As the discussion in Part IV illustrates, the joint client
situation and the allied lawyer situation are very different in very
important ways, including justifying rationale and the nature of the
relationships in each situation.
Another flaw in the court’s analysis is the court’s leap from
recognizing the parties’ desires to collaborate in their criminal defense
to the conclusion that the system of justice must support or encourage
that collaboration by recognizing a privilege for communications.
Criminal defendants may have a right to consult with each other but it is
quite a step to say that such defendants have a right to enjoy the
protection of those consultations as privileged.
The court’s motivation in finding that the privilege applied and that
the attorney could not be compelled to testify may reflect the older view
that the privilege belonged to the lawyer and protected the lawyer from
testifying about client information learned in the lawyer-client
139
relationship. This motivation is especially possible because the lower
court allowed the testimony of Mr. Sanxay about the same conversation
136. Id. at 839–40.
137. Id. at 842.
138. Id.
139. See supra Part II.C for a discussion of the older, abandoned view of the attorney–
client privilege.
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140

involving the defendants and the attorneys.

B. Historical Expansion of the Privilege in the Allied Lawyer Situation
1. Schmitt v. Emery
From 1871 until 1942, no published opinion from another United
141
States court applied the privilege in an allied lawyer situation. In 1942
142
the Minnesota Supreme Court enlarged
in Schmitt v. Emery,
application of the privilege beyond the bounds of Chahoon by applying
it not in a criminal matter but in a civil matter, arising from an
143
automobile collision. The Schmitt defendants included the owner and
driver of a car, the driver of a bus, and the company that owned the
144
bus. The plaintiff sought to have produced and admitted a document
that reflected an interview between a claims employee of the bus
145
company and the driver of the bus. The trial court directed the parties
to argue the issue of admissibility, and so the bus company shared the
report with the other defendants so that they could assist in preparing an
146
argument for inadmissibility.
The court ultimately excluded the
147
On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court,
document as privileged.
finding that the defendants were “maintaining substantially the same
cause,” determined that disclosure of the document between counsel for

140. Chahoon, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) at 835.
141. A few courts considered applying the privilege but did not. See, e.g., Smale v.
United States, 3 F.2d 101, 101–02 (7th Cir. 1924). Smale involved a conversation between two
criminal defendants, both of whom had been indicted for obstruction of justice, and the
lawyer for one of the defendants. Id. at 101. At trial the question was whether the lawyer
could testify about the statements of the defendant who was not the lawyer’s client, Smale, or
whether the conversation between the three was privileged. Id. The court did not apply the
privilege to the statements of Smale because Smale did not engage the lawyer and gave no
indication that he intended to engage the lawyer and because the lawyer did nothing to lead
Smale to believe that he would “serve” Smale. Id. at 102; see also Radio Corp. of Am. v.
Rauland Corp., 18 F.R.D. 440, 443 (N.D. Ill. 1955) (no privilege); State v. Hodgdon, 94 A.
301, 302 (Vt. 1915) (no privilege for conversation between one defendant and that
defendant’s lawyer and the lawyer for a co-defendant); Note, Waiver of Attorney–Client
Privilege on Inter-Attorney Exchange of Information, 63 YALE L.J. 1030, 1032–33 (1954) (no
cases applying the privilege from 1871 to 1942).
142. 2 N.W.2d 413 (Minn. 1942).
143. Id. at 414.
144. Id. at 414–15.
145. Id. at 415.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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148

the defendants did not waive the privilege.

2. Continental Oil Company v. United States
The next reported case applying the privilege to the allied lawyer
149
setting occurred in 1964. In Continental Oil Co. v. United States, not
only did the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals apply the privilege in an
allied lawyer situation, but it did so even though no formal legal
150
proceedings involving the parties had begun. In contrast, in Chahoon,
criminal defendants had been indicted at the time of the
communications at issue, and in Schmitt, a suit was in progress before a
court. In Continental Oil Co., during grand jury proceedings and before
any indictment, counsel for Standard Oil Company interviewed
Standard employees and counsel for Continental Oil Company
151
interviewed Continental employees.
Then the respective attorneys
prepared memoranda discussing the results of the interviews and
152
exchanged the memos.
The Continental Oil and Standard Oil
attorneys claimed that the sharing was “to make their representation of
their clients in connection with the Grand Jury investigation and any
153
resulting litigation, more effective.”
The plaintiff government
subpoenaed the memos and claimed that when the attorneys shared the
154
The trial court
memos any attorney–client privilege was waived.
155
refused to quash the government’s subpoenas.
The appellate court
disagreed, stating that the doctrine of Chahoon and Schmitt applied; the
sharing of the memos did not act as a waiver of the privilege even
though the communications occurred before an indictment or other
156
formal proceeding.
The court explained its decision by noting the
157
The court did not
value of the attorney–client privilege in general.
address the fact that applying the attorney–client privilege in an allied

148. Id. at 417.
149. 330 F.2d 347 (9th Cir. 1964).
150. Id. at 348 (grand jury proceedings).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 348.
153. Id. at 348–49.
154. Id. at 349.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 349–50.
157. Id. at 350 (“The privilege asserted here is a valuable and an important right for the
protection of any client at any stage of his dealings with counsel.”).
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lawyer situation was not a run-of-the-mill occurrence.
3. Hunydee v. United States

159

Just one year later, in Hunydee v. United States, a federal court
again applied the attorney–client privilege to an allied lawyer situation
and expanded the scope of such an application. In Hunydee, a husband
160
was indicted for attempting to evade the payment of income tax. The
161
wife was indicted for aiding in the preparation of false tax returns. At
a meeting involving both defendants and their separate attorneys, Mr.
162
Hunydee stated that he intended to “plead guilty and take the blame.”
At trial, both Mrs. Hunydee and her attorney testified about the
communications that occurred at the meeting, including Mr. Hunydee’s
163
statement. On appeal, Mr. Hunydee cited the Continental Oil decision
and argued that the court should not have permitted Mrs. Hunydee or
her attorney to testify about his statements because the attorney–client
164
privilege protected his communications made at the meeting.
The
lower court had allowed the testimony because it believed that the
attorney–client privilege did not apply because this was an allied lawyer
situation and the communication did not involve “trial strategy or
165
defenses.” On appeal, the Ninth Circuit noted that the Continental Oil
166
case did not involve “trial strategy or defenses” either and yet the
privilege applied there. The Hunydee court clarified that privileged
communications do not lose their privileged status even though they are
shared with another person and that person’s counsel if the statements
“concern common issues and are intended to facilitate representation in
167
possible subsequent proceedings.”
The court concluded that the
privilege protected Mr. Hunydee’s statements; neither Mrs. Hunydee
168
nor her attorney could testify about them.

158. Perhaps the court was distracted by the argument of smaller detail about whether
the privilege applied before an indictment or other formal procedure.
159. 355 F.2d 183 (9th Cir. 1965).
160. Id. at 184.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 184–85.
166. Id. at 185.
167. Id.
168. Id.
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4. Summary
The early acceptance and development of the doctrine applying the
attorney–client privilege to the allied lawyer setting was a bit stealthy.
The initial acceptance of the application of the attorney–client privilege
in the allied lawyer situation occurred in Chahoon in 1871, a criminal
case involving post-indictment communications in which the evidence
169
was admitted by way of another witness.
The next three cases
applying the privilege in the allied lawyer situation expanded the
170
Almost one
privilege to civil settings and to pre-litigation settings.
hundred years passed between the Chahoon decision and the Hunydee
decision. None of the three post-Chahoon courts ever returned to the
basic question of the propriety of applying the privilege in the allied
lawyer situation. These courts did not analyze whether applying the
privilege in the allied lawyer situation furthered the goals of the
attorney–client privilege. Each court accepted the conclusion of the
Chahoon court and assumed that the privilege survived disclosure in an
allied lawyer situation. Then each court dealt with smaller, subsidiary
issues.
C. The Recent Explosion of Cases
Courts in the last forty years, likewise, have accepted the general
notion that the attorney–client privilege protects communications
arising in an allied lawyer situation. These courts have simply not
looked back to analyze critically the Chahoon precedent. The import of
the error is magnified by the fact that courts are now bombarded by
many more such claims. No longer are courts dealing with one such
claim now and then. In the decade spanning 1970 to 1979, only five
171
published cases involved claims of privilege in an allied lawyer setting.
In the decade spanning from 2000 to 2009, 168 published cases involved
claims of attorney–client privilege based on some sort of common
172
interest.
The error of the Chahoon court in applying the attorney–

169. See supra Part III.A.
170. See supra Parts III.B.1–.3.
171. See supra note 1.
172. See supra notes 1, 15. Also see, for example, In re Teleglobe Commc’ns Corp., in
which the appellate court noted that lower court had incorrectly treated the situation as one
involving allied lawyers when in reality it was a joint client representation setting. 493 F.3d
345, 363–64 n.18 (3d Cir. 2007). The appellate court referred to the joint client setting as
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client privilege to the allied lawyer setting, originally an error of little
import, now has tremendous impact on the doctrine of the attorney–
client privilege.
IV. THE JOINT CLIENT SETTING
In giving birth to the idea that the attorney–client privilege should
protect communications in the allied lawyer setting, the Virginia
Supreme Court in Chahoon v. Commonwealth analogized the allied
173
The
lawyer situation to the joint client representation setting.
Chahoon court concluded that the two situations were the same in that a
lawyer for one defendant “in effect” represented the other defendants
174
present at a meeting at which the communications occurred.
The
Chahoon court then concluded that the privilege should apply to the
allied lawyer situation as it would to a joint client representation
175
situation.
The analogy upon which the application of the attorney–
client privilege to the allied lawyer setting rests is a flawed analogy. In
reality, the joint client representation situation and the allied lawyer
situation differ in very basic respects.
A. Joint Client Representation
1. Defining Joint Client Representation
Lawyers over the years have engaged in the practice of representing
176
multiple clients with regard to the same matter.
The clients must
appropriate for the “co-client privilege” and referred to the allied lawyer setting as
appropriate for the “community-of-interest privilege.” Id.
173. 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 822, 841 (1871).
174. Id. at 842.
175. Id. at 843.
176. See Lessing v. Gibbons, 45 P.2d 258, 261 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1935) (discussing
common joint representation scenarios of the time); Debra Lyn Bassett, Three’s a Crowd: A
Proposal to Abolish Joint Representation, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 387, 394 (2001); Teresa Stanton
Collett, The Promise and Peril of Multiple Representation, 16 REV. LITIG. 567, 574 (1997); see
also Merck Eprova AG v. ProThera, Inc., 670 F. Supp. 2d 201, 211 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“Courts
have long recognized the existence of the attorney–client relationship among clients and
attorneys allied in a common legal cause. Typically, parties jointly developing a patent with
an attorney commonly have a ‘common legal interest’ in obtaining the greatest protection and
in exploiting the patents. The parties thereby develop a ‘community of interest,’ which
establishes a joint attorney–client relationship among them and the attorney. In this respect,
when a community of interest exists, courts have viewed those represented as ‘joint clients’
for the purpose of privilege.” (quoting Hillerich & Bradsby v. MacKay, 26 F. Supp. 2d 124,
126 (D.D.C. 1998))). For early examples of accepted joint client representation, see Rice v.
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impliedly or expressly agree to be represented by the lawyer and must
177
agree to be a part of a common representation.
The joint
representation then consists only of the matters for which the clients
178
have agreed upon for joint representation.
Often, when the question is whether there is a joint representation,
179
the existence of representation itself is also at issue.
A party may
claim that the lawyer represented the party along with another party in a
joint representation. The lawyer may deny he or she represented the
party at all, much less in a joint capacity. The question of the joint
nature of the representation often does not receive the courts’ attention
because the courts often determine that there is no lawyer–client
180
relationship of any kind. If there is no relationship, there is no need
for courts to analyze whether a representation is joint or, rather,
separate.
An exception to these generalizations is Sky Valley Ltd. Partnership
181
v. ATX Sky Valley, Ltd. In that case, the defendants claimed that a
law firm had represented them in addition to the plaintiffs as joint
182
clients on a matter. The court determined that the lawyers in the firm
183
and the defendants were not in an attorney–client relationship.
Though the court accepted that the defendants believed that the lawyers
of the firm represented them, the court found such beliefs “clearly

Rice, 53 Ky. (14 B. Mon.) 335, 336 (1854); Gulick v. Gulick, 39 N.J. Eq. 516, 516–17 (1885);
and Whiting v. Barney, 38 Barb. 393, 397 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1862). See generally 1 FRANCIS
WHARTON, A COMMENTARY ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN CIVIL ISSUES § 587, at 561
(1877) (“It is easy to conceive of cases in which two or more persons address a lawyer as their
common agent.”).
177. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 75 cmt. c
(2000) (discussing the creation of the joint client representation); id. § 14 (discussing the
formation of the lawyer-client relationship).
178. Id. § 75 cmt. c (“The scope of the co-client relationship is determined by the extent
of the legal matter of common interest.”); see also RICE, supra note 19, § 4:30.
179. See, e.g., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Ogden Corp., 202 F.3d 454, 463 (1st Cir. 2000);
Merck Eprova, 670 F. Supp. 2d at 203.
180. See, e.g., MacKenzie–Childs LLC v. MacKenzie–Childs, 262 F.R.D. 241, 254–55
(W.D.N.Y. 2009) (finding no relationship); In re Colocotronis Tanker Secs. Litig., 449 F.
Supp. 828, 832 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (“[T]he Court concludes that the banks were not actual clients
of the firms.”).
181. 150 F.R.D. 648 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
182. Id. at 650. The defendants claimed that they were joint clients so they could have
access to certain communications.
183. Id.
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184

unreasonable.” Thus, the defendants were not clients of the lawyers of
185
the firm.
The Sky Valley court had no need to analyze the possible joint
186
nature of the relationship, but it did anyway.
The court listed the
following nonexclusive factors as relevant to the determination of joint
representation:
(1) the conduct of the two parties toward one another, (2) the
terms of any contractual relationship (express or implied) that
the two parties may have had, (3) any fiduciary or other special
obligations that existed between them, (4) the communications
between the two parties (directly or indirectly), (5) whether, to
what extent, and with respect to which matters there was
separate, private communication between either of them and the
lawyer as to whom a “joint” relationship allegedly existed, (6) if
there was any such separate, private communication between
either party and the alleged joint counsel, whether the other
party knew about it, and, if so, whether that party objected or
184. Id. at 654. The Sky Valley court stated the proper analysis for determining the
existence of a relationship involved
resolution of the dispute will turn on whether a contractual relationship was formed
implicitly. To answer that question, courts necessarily look to circumstantial
evidence, taking into account all kinds of indirect evidence and contextual
considerations that appear relevant to determining whether it would have been
reasonable for the person to have inferred that she was the client of the lawyer.
Thus, in this setting, whether the attorney–client relationship existed is a question of
law that is resolved through an objective test.
Id. at 652.
185. Id. at 650. In support of its finding that the defendants’ belief of representation was
unreasonable, the court noted that the lawyers subjectively did not consider the defendants to
be clients and never told anyone the firm represented the defendants. Id. at 654. At least one
lawyer told several people, including a representative of the defendants, that the firm did not
represent the defendants. Id. at 655. The defendants never paid the firm for services and the
firm never billed the defendants for services. Id. The defendants received letters from the
firm identifying the plaintiffs as clients but not identifying the defendants as clients. Id. Also,
the defendants had separate counsel. Id. at 655–56. The court found that the defendants
sought legal advice from the law firm and received legal advice from the law firm but only in
the defendants’ contractual role as project manager, not individually. Id. at 657. The project
contract required that the project manager consult with that law firm. Id. at 656–57. During
the project the defendants also consulted a separate lawyer about the project. Id. at 657. The
court concluded that “it would not advance the purposes of the privilege to hold that there
was an attorney–client relationship between [the defendants] and [the law firm]” but might
discourage communication by a party such as the plaintiffs. Id. at 659.
186. Id. at 661.
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sought to learn the content of the private communication, (7) the
nature and legitimacy of each party’s expectations about its
ability to access communications between the other party and
the allegedly joint counsel, (8) whether, to what extent, and with
respect to which matters either or both of the alleged joint
clients communicated privately with other lawyers, (9) the extent
and character of any interests the two alleged joint parties may
have had in common, and the relationship between common
interests and communications with the alleged joint counsel, (10)
actual and potential conflicts of interest between the two parties,
especially as they might relate to matters with respect to which
there appeared to be some commonality of interest between the
parties, and (11) if disputes arose with third parties that related
to matters the two parties had in common, whether the alleged
joint counsel represented both parties with respect to those
disputes or whether the two parties were separately
187
represented.
2. Ethical Limits of Joint Representation
Professional responsibility principles regarding concurrent conflicts
of interest greatly inform any consideration of whether a joint client
situation presents an appropriate commonality of interests to justify
representation. Specifically, Rule 1.7 of the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct states:
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not
represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent
conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of interest exists if:
(1) the representation of one client will be directly
adverse to another client; or
(2) there is a significant risk that the representation of
one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s
responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third
person or by a personal interest of the lawyer.
187. Id. at 652–63. The Sky Valley court concluded that a belief in the existence of a
joint client representation would have been unreasonable as well. Id. at 659; see also Fed.
Deposit Ins. Co. v. Ogden Corp., 202 F.3d 454, 461 (1st Cir. 2000) (“In determining whether
parties are ‘joint clients,’ courts may consider multiple factors, including but not limited to
matters such as payment arrangements, allocation of decisionmaking roles, requests for
advice, attendance at meetings, frequency and content of correspondence, and the like.”).
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(b) Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of
interest under paragraph (a), a lawyer may represent a client if:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be
able to provide competent and diligent representation to
each affected client;
(2) the representation is not prohibited by law;
(3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a
claim by one client against another client represented by the
lawyer in the same litigation or other proceeding before a
tribunal; and
(4) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed
188
in writing.
The governing rule in most jurisdictions is this rule or a close
189
approximation of it. The rule is aimed at insuring loyalty of the lawyer
to the client, which includes insuring that the lawyer exercises
independent judgment on behalf of each client in joint client settings
190
and other settings.
With regard to a joint client representation, this rule allows a lawyer
ethically to represent two or more clients at the same time, jointly or
otherwise, if the clients will not be “directly adverse” and no “significant
risk” exists that the representation of one of the clients will be
“materially limited” by the lawyer’s responsibilities to one of the other
191
joint clients. Even if one of these two conditions exists, the rule allows
192
for a representation if the four conditions in Rule 1.7(b) are satisfied.
The shared information aspect of a joint client representation makes
193
a lawyer’s representation of “directly adverse” clients impossible.

188. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7.
189. The ABA has online charts for many states comparing the state rule to the Model
Rule Charts for nineteen states state that the state rule is identical to the Model Rule. Fifteen
other state charts show that the state rule is substantially similar to the Model Rule. States
with identical rules are Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Indiana, Louisiana,
Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina,
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, and Vermont. See Charts
Comparing Professional Conduct Rules, ABA, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/profession
al_responsibility/policy/charts.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2012).
190. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 1.
191. See id. R. 1.7(a).
192. See id. R. 1.7(b).
193. See id. R. 1.7 cmt. 19 (“For example, when the lawyer represents different clients in
related matters and one of the clients refuses to consent to the disclosure necessary to permit
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Real-world clients would never consent to such and a lawyer could
never “reasonably believe[]” that, in such a situation, he or she could
“provide competent and diligent representation” to each of the joint
clients. Indeed, the comments to Rule 1.7 note that “a lawyer cannot
undertake common representation of clients where contentious
litigation or negotiations between them are imminent or
194
contemplated.”
There are many joint representation situations, however, in which
there is a “significant risk” that the representation of one of the clients
will be “materially limited” by the lawyer’s responsibilities to one of the
other joint clients. A lawyer wishing to jointly represent clients with
such a risk must then “reasonably believe[] that the lawyer will be able
to provide competent and diligent representation to each affected
195
client.” In addition, the law must not prohibit the joint representation
196
and the clients must give “informed consent, confirmed in writing.”
The comments to Rule 1.7 note that,
because the lawyer is required to be impartial between
commonly represented clients, representation of multiple clients
is improper when it is unlikely that impartiality can be
maintained. Generally, if the relationship between the parties
has already assumed antagonism, the possibility that the clients’
interests can be adequately served by common representation is
not very good. Other relevant factors are whether the lawyer
subsequently will represent both parties on a continuing basis
and whether the situation involves creating or terminating a
197
relationship between the parties.
The comments specifically note that “[a] particularly important
factor” in deciding whether a joint representation is appropriate is the
ramifications for the duty of confidentiality and the attorney–client

the other client to make an informed decision, the lawyer cannot properly ask the latter to
consent.”).
194. Id. R. 1.7 cmt. 29.
195. Id. R. 1.7(b)(1).
196. Id. R. 1.7(b)(2), (b)(4). The rule also prohibits a lawyer from suing a current client
on behalf of another. See id. R. 1.7(b)(3). This situation is a subset of the set of situations in
which the clients are “directly adverse.” Id. R. 1.7(a)(1). As established above, no joint
representation is possible in any situation of direct adversity. Id.
197. Id. R. 1.7 cmt. 29.
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198

privilege. With regard to a lawyer obtaining consent from clients to a
joint client representation and the sharing of information that such a
representation necessarily entails, Comment 31 to Rule 1.7 provides:
The lawyer should, at the outset of the common representation
and as part of the process of obtaining each client’s informed
consent, advise each client that information will be shared and
that the lawyer will have to withdraw if one client decides that
some matter material to the representation should be kept from
199
the other.
The lawyer must explain that his or her allegiance is to both clients;
200
the lawyer cannot favor one joint client over another joint client. To
obtain “informed consent,” the lawyer must obtain the potential joint
clients’ agreement to the course of conduct after the lawyer explains to
them “the material risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the
201
proposed course of conduct.”
In addition, a joint client representation cannot occur if law prohibits
it. Comment 16 to Rule 1.7 notes that some states, for example, prohibit
one lawyer from representing more than one defendant in a criminal
202
matter involving the death penalty.
Some jurisdictions have
disapproved of joint representations that once were thought permissible.
For example, some courts consider certain types of land transfers to be
203
improper settings for joint representation. Yet, the representation of a

198. Id. R. 1.7 cmt. 30.
199. Id. R. 1.7 cmt. 31. Comment 31 continues,
In limited circumstances, it may be appropriate for the lawyer to proceed with the
representation when the clients have agreed, after being properly informed, that the
lawyer will keep certain information confidential. For example, the lawyer may
reasonably conclude that failure to disclose one client's trade secrets to another
client will not adversely affect representation involving a joint venture between the
clients and agree to keep that information confidential with the informed consent of
both clients.
Id.
200. See id. R. 1.7 cmt. 32.
201. See id. R. 1.0(e).
202. See id. R. 1.7 cmt. 16.
203. See, e.g., Baldasarre v. Butler, 625 A.2d 458, 464–65 (N.J. 1993) (joint
representation of buyer and seller in a complex commercial real estate transaction not
allowed). See generally Robert H. Aronson, Conflict of Interest, 52 WASH. L. REV. 807, 814
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buyer and a seller in a real estate transaction was once thought of as an
204
acceptable and very common setting for a joint client representation.
Comment 29 to Rule 1.7 addresses the failure of a joint client
representation by warning that “if the common representation fails . . .
205
the result can be additional cost, embarrassment and recrimination.”
The lawyer “ordinarily” must withdraw from representation of all of the
206
joint clients if an impermissible conflict arises.
While joint
representation has existed throughout the ages, it is a representation
fraught with potential conflict-of-interest problems. At least one
commentator has argued that the practice should be abolished entirely
207
because the risks far outweigh any benefits.
B. Joint Client Representation and the Attorney–Client Privilege
1. Generally
The evidentiary principle of the attorney–client privilege
traditionally has applied to the joint client representation group—the
lawyer and the joint clients that the lawyer represents on the matter of
208
common interest.
These communications are confidential
(1977) (“Dual representation is virtually always improper in transactions such as the sale of
property because of the very high probability that future conflicts of interest will develop.”).
Some states have disapproved of joint representation in uncontested divorce cases. See, e.g.,
Walden v. Hoke, 429 S.E.2d 504, 509 (W. Va. 1993) (“The likelihood of prejudice is so great
with dual representation so as to make adequate representation of both spouses impossible,
even where the separation is ‘friendly’ and the divorce uncontested.”). See generally Mary E.
Chesser, Joint Representation in a Friendly Divorce: Inherently Unethical?, 27 J. LEGAL PROF.
155 (2003).
204. See Lessing v. Gibbons, 45 P.2d 258, 261 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1935).
205. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 29.
206. See id. But see N.Y. State Bar Ass’n. Comm. on Prof. Ethics Op. 823, at 2–3, 5
(2008) (stating that the lawyer must withdraw from representing one of the joint clients when
the interests of the clients diverge but that the lawyer can continue to represent the other
client if that client consents).
207. See Bassett, supra note 176, at 458. Bassett argues that a joint representation is a
lesser representation because of the divided loyalty of the lawyer and that the client’s consent
is “illusory protection.” Id. For further discussion of the costs and benefits of joint client
representation, see Chesser, supra note 203, at 158–61; Collett, supra note 176, at 574–77; and
Nancy J. Moore, Conflicts of Interest in the Simultaneous Representation of Multiple Clients: A
Proposed Solution to the Current Confusion and Controversy, 61 TEX. L. REV. 211, 251–56
(1982).
208. See Dexia Credit Local v. Rogan, 231 F.R.D. 287, 293 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (“[W]here
two or more persons jointly consult an attorney concerning a mutual concern, their
confidential communications with the attorney, although known to each other, will of course
be privileged in the controversy of either or both of the clients with the outside world.”
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communications between lawyers and clients and, thus, are privileged.
In effect, privilege law treats the joint clients as one client that is a group
of individuals or entities. With this view, the second or other joint
clients are not third parties to the representation or the communication,
and so the presence of the second or other joint clients does not destroy
the confidentiality necessary for the privilege to attach as would occur if
a third party is present for a communication involving a lawyer and a
client. Likewise, if a communication between a lawyer and a joint client
is later shared with another joint client, the sharing does not waive the
privilege as would occur if the communication were shared with a third
209
party.
No one joint client can waive the privilege’s protection if the other
210
joint clients do not consent. A slight caveat is that one joint client can
(internal quotations omitted)); Bank Brussels Lambert v. Credit Lyonnais (Suisse) S.A., 160
F.R.D. 437, 446 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (“At its core, ‘[t]he “common interest” doctrine applies
when multiple persons are represented by the same attorney.
In that situation,
communications made to the shared attorney . . . remain privileged as to the rest of the
world’” (quoting N. River Ins. Co. v. Phila. Reinsurance Corp., 797 F. Supp. 363, 366 (D.N.J.
1992))).
This rule has been true for a very long time. See Marcuse v. Kramer, 5 Teiss. 247, 250 (La.
Ct. App. 1908) (“‘Two or more persons sometimes address a lawyer as a common agent. So
far as concerns strangers, these communications are privileged, but not as between
themselves. As they stand on the same footing as to the lawyer, either can compel him to
testify against the other as to their negotiations.’” (quoting EDWARD P. WEEKS, A TREATISE
ON ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELLORS AT LAW § 175 (2d ed. 1892))).
209. In a traditional representation, the presence of a third party destroys any
presumption of confidentiality necessary for the attorney–client privilege to attach.
Disclosure of an otherwise privileged communication to a third party waives the privilege.
See WebXchange Inc. v. Dell Inc., 264 F.R.D. 123, 126 (D. Del. 2010) (“A communication is
not made in confidence, and in turn is not privileged, if persons other than the client, its
attorney, or their agents are present. Similarly, if a client shares an otherwise privileged
communication with a third party, then the communication is no longer confidential and the
client has waived the privilege.” (citation omitted)); see also supra Part II.D (for a discussion
of the confidentiality requirement).
210. See In re Teleglobe Commc’ns Corp., 493 F.3d 345, 363 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[W]aiving
the joint-client privilege requires the consent of all joint clients.”); Robert Bosch LLC v.
Pylon Mfg. Corp., 263 F.R.D. 142, 145 (D. Del. 2009) (“Waiver of the privilege requires the
consent of all joint clients.”). For an earlier statement, see Herman v. Schlesinger, 90 N.W.
460, 463 (Wis. 1902) (“When an attorney’s services in a transaction are rendered to several
persons, confidential communications to him in regard thereto, in which all such persons are
interested, cannot be properly disclosed unless all join in consenting thereto. The rule in that
regard has been carried so far as to preclude an attorney from divulging matters
confidentially communicated to him by a firm without the individual consent of every
member thereof. The reason for that is obvious. The privilege of secrecy is purely a personal
right. When it affects several persons there is no way by which all can be protected in respect
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reveal his or her communications with counsel, but only to the extent
that the disclosure does not reveal any of the protected communications
211
of the other joint clients.
If the joint clients become adverse in a
proceeding, however, the privilege does not protect any of the
212
communications from the joint representation.
2. The Restatement Approach
The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers provides
separate sections for the joint client representation setting and the allied
lawyer setting. Section 75 deals with the joint client representation
setting, providing as follows:
(1) If two or more persons are jointly represented by the
same lawyer in a matter, a communication of either co-client
that otherwise qualifies as privileged under §§ 68–72 and relates
to matters of common interest is privileged as against third
persons, and any co-client may invoke the privilege, unless it has
been waived by the client who made the communication.
(2) Unless the co-clients have agreed otherwise, a
communication described in Subsection (1) is not privileged as
between the co-clients in a subsequent adverse proceeding
213
between them.
thereto other than by holding that all must join in lifting the veil of silence, or it must remain
a secure cover for those things which it would obscure if they related to a single person only.”
(citation omitted)); see also RICE, supra note 19, § 4:30.
211. See Teleglobe Commc’ns Corp., 493 F.3d at 363 (“[A] client may unilaterally waive
the privilege as to its own communications with a joint attorney, so long as those
communications concern only the waiving client; it may not, however, unilaterally waive the
privilege as to any of the other joint clients’ communications or as to any of its
communications that relate to other joint clients.”); Robert Bosch, 263 F.R.D. at 145–46
(stating that, in a joint client situation, a co-client “may unilaterally waive the privilege
regarding its communications with the joint attorney, but cannot unilaterally waive the
privilege for the other joint clients or any communications that related to those clients”); Am.
Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct., 113 Cal. Rptr. 561, 573–74 (Ct. App. 1974).
212. See Brennan’s, Inc. v. Brennan’s Rests., Inc., 590 F.2d 168, 172 (5th Cir. 1979)
(“Assuming the prior representation was joint, . . . neither of the parties to th[e] suit can
assert the attorney–client privilege against the other as to matters comprehended by that joint
representation.”); Gottlieb v. Wiles, 143 F.R.D. 241, 247 (D. Colo. 1992) (“[W]hen parties
with a common interest retain a single attorney to represent them [and] . . . later become
adverse, neither is permitted to assert the attorney–client privilege as to communications
occurring during the period of common interest.”); see also MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK,
supra note 72, § 5:19, at 568; RICE, supra note 19, § 4:33.
213. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 75 (2000).
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This provision is an accurate description of how courts, in the years
before the creation of the Restatement, applied the attorney–client
privilege in the joint client setting.
3. Historical Acceptance of Applying the Attorney–Client Privilege in
the Joint Client Setting
As the Virginia Supreme Court in Chahoon v. Commonwealth
correctly noted in 1871, historically the attorney–client privilege has
214
protected communications in joint client settings.
Early cases in the
United States do not treat this application of the privilege as
controversial. Rather, it is treated as an accepted and indisputable point
of law—an inherent side-effect of clients being clients as a group. For
example, in 1854, in Rice v. Rice, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky
dealt with the question of whether a lawyer who had previously
represented two people jointly could testify as to communications that
215
occurred in the midst of the joint representation.
The court stated,
“As the communications were made to an attorney, who was acting at
the time as the legal adviser of the parties, it is clear that he would not
be permitted to disclose them in any controversy between them and a
216
217
third person.” And in Whiting v. Barney, a New York court stated,
“Unquestionably, the communication in this case was so far privileged
as that the attorney would not be required or permitted to disclose it as
a witness in favor of a third person, against both his clients, without their
218
consent.”
214. 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 822, 841 (1871) (“A man may be the counsel of two or more
parties, concerning the same subject matter, and in all such cases confidential
communications made to him by one or all of such parties, jointly or severally, in reference to
such matter, are privileged.”).
215. 53 Ky. (14 B. Mon.) 335, 335–36 (1854).
216. Id. at 336. Because the later matter was a controversy between the two formerly
joint clients, the court allowed the testimony to be admitted. Id.
217. 38 Barb. 393 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1862).
218. Id. at 397; see also Gulick v. Gulick, 39 N.J. Eq. 516, 517 (1885) (“Thus, Mr.
Wharton says, vol. 1 § 587: ‘It is easy to conceive of cases in which two or more persons
address a lawyer as their common agent. So far as concerns a stranger, their communication
to the lawyer would be privileged. It is otherwise, however, as to themselves; as they stand on
the same footing as to the lawyer, either could compel him to testify against the other as to
their negotiations.’” (quoting WHARTON, supra note 176, § 587)); Harris v. Daugherty, 11
S.W. 921, 923 (Tex. 1889) (“The rule is that if the witness is the attorney of both parties in a
transaction of this character, the communications made to him in course of the business are
privileged, except in a controversy between the parties themselves.”).
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Applying the attorney–client privilege to the joint client
representation setting in the twenty-first century, therefore, is not an
expansion of the application of the attorney–client privilege from its
traditional metes and bounds of the 1800s. Communications in the joint
client situation that would have the benefit of privilege protection now
would have had that same protection then.
4. An Additional but Erroneous Requirement Resulting from the
Confusion with the Allied Lawyer Setting
Some courts have imposed an additional but erroneous requirement
for application of the privilege in a joint client setting: proof of a
common interest beyond that common interest inherent in a joint client
representation. For example, in Dexia Credit Local v. Rogan, the court
evaluated a claim of privilege in a situation in which two parties were
represented by the same law firm with regard to claims of fraud against
219
common adversaries.
This was a joint client representation setting.
The Dexia court began by noting
[w]here two or more persons jointly consult an attorney
concerning a mutual concern, “their confidential
communications with the attorney, although known to each
other, will of course be privileged in the controversy of either
or both of the clients with the outside world . . . .” (citations
omitted). Moreover, the joint defense privilege cannot be
waived without the consent of all parties to the defense,
except in the situation where one of the joint defendants
220
becomes an adverse party in a litigation.
This statement seems to accept the commonality of interest inherent
in a joint client representation. But the court continued by requiring the
parties to make an additional proof—proof of a common interest that is
more than simply proof of an interest sufficient for the creation of a
joint client representation. The Dexia court stated,
While often arising in the context of a joint defense, the
common interest doctrine more generally applies to any parties
219. 231 F.R.D. 268, 272–75 (N.D. Ill. 2004).
220. Id. at 273 (alteration in original) (quoting Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Kaplan,
90 F.R.D. 21, 29 (N.D. Ill. 1980)).
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who have a “common interest” in current or potential litigation,
either as actual or potential plaintiffs or defendants. To
maintain the privilege, the common interest must relate to a
litigation interest, and not merely a common business interest. If
there is some or even substantial overlap between the litigation
and business interests, the common interest doctrine still applies
so long as a “community of interest” can be established with
respect to the documents. . . .
. . . [T]he parties who assert a common interest as the basis for
their assertion of privilege (where otherwise it would not exist
due to the shared communications), must simply demonstrate
“actual cooperation toward a common legal goal” with respect
221
to the documents they seek to withhold.
In making these statements, the court did not rely upon cases
involving joint client representation settings, but rather it relied upon
cases involving parties with separate counsel—that is, cases in the allied
222
lawyer setting.
Such an analysis that requires a showing beyond the presence of a
joint client representation leaves open the possibility that a court would
deny the privilege even when the purposes of the attorney–client
privilege are otherwise present.
For example, the joint client
representation might arise in a setting not involving litigation or its
threat. The Dexia court stated that “[t]o maintain the privilege, the
common interest must relate to a litigation interest, and not merely a
223
common business interest.”
In such a situation the lawyer will have
evaluated the positions of the clients and will have decided, in
accordance with ethics concepts, that a joint representation would be
ethical. The interest of the clients would be “common” enough for a
joint representation by one lawyer. The clients would be seeking legal
advice, just not advice regarding litigation. Such a result would cause a
denial of the privilege, a notion contrary to traditional understandings of
privilege law in general and traditional applications of privilege law to
the context of joint client representation.
This expanded common interest requirement should not apply in the
221. Id. (citations omitted).
222. Id. For example, the Dexia court relied on, in order, Beneficial Franchise Co., Inc.
v. Bank One, N.A., 205 F.R.D. 212 (N.D. Ill. 2001), Strougo v. BEA Assocs., 199 F.R.D. 515
(S.D.N.Y. 2001), and United States v. Evans, 113 F.3d 1457 (7th Cir. 1997).
223. Dexia, 231 F.R.D. at 273.
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joint client representation setting. The sharing of interest inherent in
the ethical joint client representation should be all that is required for
the privilege to apply. A lawyer cannot represent more than one client
on the same matter if there is an impermissible conflict of interest—the
224
clients’ interests must align significantly. The stated requirement of a
common interest is simply a statement of this reality of joint
representation. In the context of applying the attorney–client privilege
to joint clients, the joint representation defines the requisite common
interest. There need be no independent analysis of common interest
other than a determination that the communication is in furtherance of
the joint representation—that is, intended to be a part of the joint client
representation. If the parties’ interests are aligned such that joint
representation is desirable and ethical, the interests are sufficiently
common.
Before the explosion of allied lawyer setting privilege cases, courts
applying the privilege in the joint representation setting seemed to
understand this principle. These courts did not mention a common
interest; the joint client representation setting was sufficient proof of
225
shared interest.
The learned treatises of the time did not treat the
presence of a common interest as an independent requirement for the
226
For example, the version of Wigmore’s
application of the privilege.
treatise published in 1905 stated the following:

224. See supra Part IV.A.2.
225. See, e.g., Baldwin v. Comm’r, 125 F.2d 812 (9th Cir. 1942) (dealing with privilege
issue in a joint client representation setting with no mention of common interest); Grand
Trunk W. R.R. Co. v. H.W. Nelson Co., 116 F.2d 823 (6th Cir. 1941) (considering privilege
issue in a joint client representation setting without mention of common interest); Lew Moy
v. United States, 237 F. 50 (8th Cir. 1916) (considering privilege issue in a joint client
representation setting with no mention of common interest); see also Simpson v. Motorists
Mut. Ins. Co., 494 F.2d 850, 855 (7th Cir. 1974) (stating that privilege applies when attorney
represents two parties with a common interest, without discussing the common interest
separately); Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1103 (5th Cir. 1970) (same).
226. See, e.g., WEEKS, supra note 208, § 175 (“Two or more persons sometimes address a
lawyer as a common agent. So far as concerns strangers, these communications are
privileged, but not as between themselves. As they stand on the same footing as to the
lawyer, either can compel him to testify against the other as to their negotiations.”);
WHARTON, supra note 176, § 587 (“It is easy to conceive of cases in which two or more
persons address a lawyer as their common agent. So far as concerns a stranger, their
communications to the lawyer would be privileged. It is otherwise, however, as to
themselves; and as they stand on the same footing as to the lawyer, either could compel him
to testify against the other as to their negotiations.”).
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Communications to Opponent or His Attorney or in
Opponent’s Presence; Joint Attorney. There may be a relative,
not an absolute, confidence. The chief instance occurs when the
same attorney acts for two parties having a common interest, and
each party communicates with him. Here the communications
are clearly privileged from disclosure at the instance of a third
person. Yet they are not privileged in a controversy between the
two original parties, inasmuch as the common interest and
227
employment forbade concealment by either from the other.
Wigmore used the phrase, “common interest,” but not to add a
requirement in addition to the necessity of a joint representation.
Rather, the phrase, “common interest” explains when a representation
is a joint representation as opposed to a lawyer representing two or
more clients separately in a related matter. A few early courts mention
a shared interest, but use it in a definitional, descriptive fashion—more a
method of describing the nature of a joint representation as opposed to
a lawyer’s separate representation of two clients, not as an additional
and separate requirement for application of the attorney–client
228
privilege. If a lawyer represents one of the joint clients in a separate
matter, communications relating to the separate matter would not be a
part of the joint client representation and would not be treated as a
229
communication in a joint client representation.
Some situations accentuate the historical lack of a common interest
227. 4 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS
AT COMMON LAW § 2312, at 3235 (1905).
228. See, e.g., Croce v. Super. Ct., 68 P.2d 369, 370 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1937) (“[T]he
communications made by parties united in a common interest to their joint or common
counsel, while privileged against strangers, are not privileged as between such parties nor as
between their counsel and any of them, when later they assume adverse positions.”);
Crawford v. Raible, 221 N.W. 474, 478 (Iowa 1928) (“[T]he testimony of an attorney as to a
transaction in which two parties consult him, for their mutual benefit, is not privileged in an
action between such parties or their representatives involving such transaction.”); Martin v.
Slifkin, 293 N.Y.S. 213, 214 (App. Div. 1937) (“The testimony of the attorney who handled
the transaction was properly admitted on the trial, as it was not privileged under section 353
of the Civil Practice Act, for the reason that the parties on both sides consulted this witness
for their mutual benefit.”).
229. See, e.g., Rudow v. Cohen, No. 85 Civ. 9323 (LBS), 1988 WL 13746, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 18, 1988) (“Simply because Rudow and LOPC were jointly represented in the Alvarez
matter, does not permit Rudow access to every conceivable communication generated by
Litton about Rudow during that period. Clearly, in order to be discoverable under the joint
client exception, the communication would have to relate to the subject matter of the joint
representation.”); see also RICE, supra note 19, § 4:30.
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requirement separate from the shared interest inherent in a joint client
representation. For example, if, after a joint client representation has
begun, the interests of the joint clients diverge such that the joint
representation is no longer ethically proper, courts have held that the
230
privilege may still apply. At such a point of divergence, it is clear that
there is insufficient shared interest even for a joint client representation
much less for satisfying any additional common interest requirement.
Yet, courts have applied the privilege. In Federal Deposit Insurance Co.
v. Ogden Corp., in an attempt to block disclosure of certain
communications, the defendant claimed that though a joint client
representation may have existed, the relationship dissolved when the
defendant realized that its interests diverged from that of the other joint
231
clients.
Thus, communications after that divergence should not be
accessible by the other joint clients. The court stated, “A joint attorney–
client relationship remains intact until it is expressly terminated or until
circumstances arise that readily imply to all the joint clients that the
232
relationship is over.” Because the joint representation continued, any
233
communications could not be kept from the other joint clients.
Clearly, in this court’s view, the determinative fact is the clients’
reasonable belief in the joint representation and not the lack of common
interest at the time of the communications. If the parties believe the
joint representation has dissolved, then each can assert the privilege
against the other with regard to communications after the dissolution
even though the attorney may be acting unethically in continuing to
234
represent both parties.
Unfortunately, the Dexia court’s approach of requiring a heightened
proof of common interest in the joint representation setting is evidence
that some courts have become confused about how to apply the
attorney–client privilege in a joint client representation setting. The
230. See, e.g., Eureka Inv. Corp., N.V. v. Chi. Title Ins. Co., 743 F.2d 932, 937–38 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (a lawyer’s improper behavior in not avoiding the conflict does not deprive the
clients of the privilege); see also MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 72, § 5:19, at 566.
231. 202 F.3d 454, 462 (1st Cir. 2000).
232. Id. at 463.
233. Id. at 464.
234. See In re Teleglobe Commc’ns Corp., 493 F.3d. 345, 368 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[C]ourts
are presented with a difficult problem when a joint attorney . . . continues representing both
clients when their interests become adverse. In this situation, the black-letter law is that when
an attorney (improperly) represents two clients whose interests are adverse, the
communications are privileged against each other notwithstanding the lawyer’s misconduct.”
(citation omitted)).
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confusion results from courts applying a common interest standard
necessarily developed in allied lawyer settings to joint client
representation settings. Courts have become confused because they
seem to believe that the doctrine that these courts often refer to as the
common interest doctrine applies in the joint client representation
235
scenario and in the allied lawyer scenario in exactly the same way. In
fact, these two situations are not the same.
In the joint client representation scenario, a heightened requirement
of common interest is not necessary. The common interest is inherent in
the nature of the representation. As long as the communication is in the
context of the joint representation and as long as it satisfies the other
236
elements of the attorney–client privilege, then the communication
should enjoy the privilege. The Washington Court of Appeals in
237
Broyles v. Thurston County more appropriately deals with the
application of the privilege in a joint client representation situation, in
line with the historical precedent before the allied lawyer confusion. In
Broyles, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s finding of privilege
and quoted the trial court as follows:
It’s clear to me that all of the people went to see . . . [the]
attorneys to get legal advice about their situation at work. They
went as a group. An attorney/client relationship resulted from
that meeting when they went to get legal advice about their
situation at work. . . . That’s the consequence of going to see
attorneys in a confidential situation and asking them questions.
Going as a group with a common problem, statements of all are
protected. And no one individual at that meeting can waive
privilege for all. And so I believe that the attorney/client
238
privilege prevailed at that meeting and should be honored.
This is the simple and correct approach to applying the attorney–
client privilege in a joint client representation setting.

235. See, e.g., Dexia Credit Local v. Rogan, 231 F.R.D. 268 (N.D. Ill 2004). See
discussion of Dexia supra notes 219–22 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 60–64 for a breakdown of the elements needed for attorney–client
privilege.
237. 195 P.3d 985 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008).
238. Id. at 1002.

08-GIESEL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2011–2012]

3/20/2012 2:05 PM

END THE EXPERIMENT

529

5. The Peculiar Confusion of Joint Clients in the Entity Environment
The application of the attorney–client privilege to the joint client
representation setting also has suffered a bit of confusion as a result of
some courts’ skepticism of claims arising in entity representation. Entity
employees sometimes claim that attorneys representing the entity also
239
represent the individual employees, separately or jointly. Because the
test of representation is the honest and reasonable belief of the person
240
in the position of client, it is certainly possible that an employee might
honestly and reasonably believe that he or she is represented by the
entity attorney depending on what the attorney says when dealing with
the individual, what the individual communicates to the attorney, and
241
other circumstances of the situation. If the individual has this honest
and reasonable belief, the attorney–client privilege may apply to
communications within that attorney–client relationship, provided the
other elements required to protect the privilege also are present (i.e.,
the communications are for the purpose of obtaining legal advice and
are confidential and not in furtherance of a crime or fraud).
Some courts have not applied the honest and reasonable belief

239. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 274 F.3d 563, 571–72 (1st Cir. 2001); In re
Grand Jury Subpoenas, 144 F.3d 653, 658–59 (10th Cir. 1998); United States v. Int’l Bhd. of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of Am., 119 F.3d 210, 215 (2d Cir. 1997);
In re Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Mgmt. Corp., 805 F.2d 120, 123–26 (3d Cir. 1986);
Tuttle v. Combined Ins. Co., 222 F.R.D. 424, 428–30 (E.D. Cal. 2004); Grassmueck v. Ogden
Murphy Wallace, P.L.L.C., 213 F.R.D. 567, 571–72 (W.D. Wash. 2003).
240. See Boston Scientific Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson Inc., 647 F. Supp. 2d 369, 373
(D. Del. 2009) (“Under Delaware law, where there is no express contract or formal retainer
agreement evidencing an attorney–client relationship, ‘courts look at the contacts between
the potential clients and its potential lawyers to determine whether it would have been
reasonable for the “client” to believe that the attorney was acting on its behalf as counsel.’”
(quoting Benchmark Capital Partners IV, L.P. v. Vague, No. C.A. 19719-NC, 2002 WL
31057462, at *3 (Del. Ch. Sept. 3, 2002))); NLRB v. Jackson Hosp. Corp., 257 F.R.D. 302, 312
(D.D.C. 2009) (“[I]t is well settled that ‘the relationship between attorney and client hinges
on the client’s intention to seek legal advice and his belief that he is consulting an attorney.’
Thus, to determine whether there is an attorney–client relationship here, I must determine
whether the Union ‘believed [it] was seeking advice and whether [the Union’s] belief about
the confidentiality of the conversation was reasonable.’” (alteration in original) (quoting
Jones v. United States, 828 A.2d 169, 176 (D.C. 2003))); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 14 (2000) (discussing the requirements for the formation
of an attorney–client relationship).
241. See Sky Valley Ltd. P’ship v. ATX Sky Valley, Ltd., 150 F.R.D. 648, 651 (N.D. Cal.
1993) (“[T]he courts have focused on whether it would have been reasonable, taking into
account all the relevant circumstances, for the person who attempted to invoke the joint client
exception to have inferred that she was in fact a ‘client’ of the lawyer.”).
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standard, however. They require that the individual, to succeed on a
claim of privilege, make proofs beyond those in other attorney–client
242
privilege settings.
These courts value the rights of the corporation
with regard to the attorney–client privilege over the rights of the
individual. Yet, no valid policy justifies derogation of the rights of the
individual for the benefit of the entity. In addition, such a position is in
243
contravention of ethics principles governing attorney conduct. Such a
244
stance is misguided.
If the circumstances of the situation show that the attorney, the
entity, and the individual are involved in a joint representation, then the
attorney–client privilege should apply to communications within that
relationship if the required elements of the attorney–client privilege are
satisfied. The individual must prove, however, the joint nature of the
representation. There is no valid policy justification for applying a
different rule to the entity situation.

242. See, e.g., Bevill, 805 F.2d at 123 (noting that for the recognition of individual
attorney–client privilege, the individual must prove that the individual “‘approached [counsel]
for the purpose of seeking legal advice,’” that the individual was clear with counsel that he or
she sought legal advice in his or her individual capacity, that the lawyer communicated with
the individual in his or her individual capacity even with the possibility of a conflict of interest
on the horizon, that the communications were confidential, and that the communications “did
not concern matters within the company or the general affairs of the company” (quoting In re
Grand Jury Investigation, 575 F. Supp. 777 (N.D. Ga. 1983))); Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 119
F.3d at 215 (rejecting honest and reasonable belief standard and discussing Bevill
approvingly); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 274 F.3d at 572 (applying Bevill factors but noting
that an individual privilege could be claimed even when a consultation involved the “general
affairs” of the corporation if the focus of the consultation was with regard to the “‘individual
officer’s personal rights and liabilities’” (quoting In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 156 F.3d 1038,
1041 (10th Cir. 1998))).
243. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(f) (“In dealing with an
organization’s directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders or other constituents, a
lawyer shall explain the identity of the client when the lawyer knows or reasonably should
know that the organization’s interests are adverse to those of the constituents with whom the
lawyer is dealing.”); see also id. R. 4.3 (directing a lawyer, in the course of a representation
who is dealing with unrepresented parties, not to imply disinterestedness and to correct
misunderstandings about the lawyer’s role).
244. See Grace M. Giesel, Upjohn Warnings, the Attorney–Client Privilege, and
Principles of Lawyer Ethics: Achieving Harmony, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 109 (2010) (discussing
the possibility of the existence of an attorney–client relationship and application of the
attorney–client privilege in such an entity setting).
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V. THE ALLIED LAWYER SETTING AND THE ATTORNEY–CLIENT
PRIVILEGE
In contrast to communications that occur in the joint client
representation situation, communications in the allied lawyer setting
should not have the benefit of the privilege.
A. Current Application of the Privilege in the Allied Lawyer Setting
245

First applied in Chahoon v. Commonwealth
as a privilege
applicable only in allied lawyer settings involving criminal matters in
246
reference to a joint defense, courts now apply the privilege in both
247
criminal and civil settings. While some courts require that litigation be
248
on the horizon, others apply the privilege even in transactional
245. 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 822 (1871).
246. Chahoon involved jointly indicted defendants in a criminal matter. See id. at 835;
supra discussion Part III.A.
247. See, e.g., United States v. Weissman, 195 F.3d 96, 99–100 (2d Cir. 1999) (stating
that, in a criminal matter, the privilege could have applied if the interests of the parties were
aligned and they had agreed to work together); Tobaccoville USA, Inc. v. McMaster, 692
S.E.2d 526, 530 (S.C. 2010) (privilege may apply to communications between South Carolina
Attorney General and the National Association of Attorneys General about issues following
from implementation of national tobacco litigation settlement agreement). For a discussion
of the application of the privilege in the allied lawyer setting and in the criminal context, see
Lerner, supra note 6. For a discussion of the parameters of the privilege as applied to the
allied lawyer setting, see Nicole Garsombke, Note, A Tragedy of the Common: The Common
Interest Rule, Its Common Misuses, and an Uncommon Solution, 40 GA. L. REV. 615 (2006).
See generally Bartel, supra note 6; Katharine Traylor Schaffzin, An Uncertain Privilege: Why
the Common Interest Doctrine Does Not Work and How Uniformity Can Fix It, 15 B.U. PUB.
INT. L.J. 49 (2005) [hereinafter Schaffzin, Common Interest]; Susan K. Rushing, Note,
Separating the Joint-Defense Doctrine from the Attorney–Client Privilege, 68 TEX. L. REV.
1273 (1990). For a discussion of ethical and malpractice issues surrounding the privilege, see
George S. Mahaffey, Jr., All for One and One for All? Legal Malpractice Arising from Joint
Defense Consortiums and Agreements, The Final Frontier in Professional Liability, 35 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 21 (2003); Todd M. Sahner, Running the Ethical Obstacle Course: Joint Defense
Agreements, 28 STETSON L. REV. 339 (1998); Katharine Traylor Schaffzin, Eyes Wide Shut:
How Ignorance of the Common Interest Doctrine Can Compromise Informed Consent, 42 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 71 (2008); Amy Foote, Note, Joint Defense Agreements in Criminal
Prosecutions: Tactical and Ethical Implications, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 377 (1999);
Matthew D. Forsgren, Note, The Outer Edge of the Envelope: Disqualification of White Collar
Criminal Defense Attorneys Under the Joint Defense Doctrine, 78 MINN. L. REV. 1219 (1994).
248. See, e.g., United States v. Newell, 315 F.3d 510, 525 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding the
threat of litigation necessary); In re Santa Fe Int’l Corp., 272 F.3d 705, 711 (5th Cir. 2001)
(“palpable threat of litigation” required); United States v. Duke Energy Corp., 214 F.R.D.
383, 388 (M.D.N.C. 2003) (requiring an agreement to “share information as a result of a
common legal interest relating to ongoing or contemplated litigation”). See generally
MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 72, § 5:20, at n.7.
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249

contexts. The claimers of the privilege need not be defendants, as the
250
251
claimers were in Chahoon.
They can be plaintiffs.
Although the
privilege appears to be an especially popular claim in patent and
252
253
trademark matters, it is claimed in all sorts of contexts.
Some courts may require both parties to the communication to be
254
attorneys. Other courts seem to require that at least one attorney be
255
involved for the communication to be privileged.
In contrast, some
courts do not require the presence of an attorney for the privilege to
256
apply to communications in the allied lawyer context.
All courts require the parties claiming the privilege in the allied
249. See In re Teleglobe Commc’ns Corp., 493 F.3d 345, 364 (3d Cir. 2007) (“It applies in
civil and criminal litigation, and even in purely transactional contexts.”).
250. 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 822 (1871); see also supra discussion Part III.A.
251. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 902 F.2d 244, 249 (4th Cir. 1990); United
States ex rel. Purcell v. MWI Corp., 209 F.R.D. 21, 25 (D.D.C. 2002) (“‘[W]hether the jointly
interested persons are defendants or plaintiffs . . . the rationale for the joint defense rule
remains unchanged.’” (quoting In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 902 F.2d at 249)); Sedlacek v.
Morgan Whitney Trading Group, Inc., 795 F. Supp. 329, 331 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (“In order to
ensure that inequities in discovery are not established in cooperating defendants’ favor, it is
necessary to extend the common interest rule to cooperating plaintiffs.”).
252. See, e.g., B.E. Meyers & Co., Inc. v. United States, 41 Fed. Cl. 729, 734–35 (1998)
(holding that the privilege applied, in a patent infringement action against the government, to
communications involving a contractor who was not a defendant); Leader Techs., Inc. v.
Facebook, Inc., 719 F. Supp. 2d 373, 376 (D. Del. 2010) (privilege claimed in dispute between
patentee and a litigation financing company but court did not find a common interest); In re
Smirman, 267 F.R.D. 221, 222–23 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (privilege applied in a patent
infringement action).
253. See, e.g., Fojtasek v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd., 262 F.R.D. 650, 652, 656 (S.D. Fla. 2009)
(action claiming cruise line negligence caused the death of a passenger); Duke Energy, 214
F.R.D. at 384 (action to enforce the Clean Air Act).
254. See, e.g., Teleglobe Commc’ns Corp., 493 F.3d at 365 (“The attorney-sharing
requirement helps prevent abuse by ensuring that the common-interest privilege only
supplants the disclosure rule when attorneys, not clients, decide to share information in order
to coordinate legal strategies.”).
255. See, e.g., United States v. Gotti, 771 F. Supp. 535, 545 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (“The
defendants would extend the application of the joint defense privilege to conversations
among the defendants themselves even in the absence of any attorney during the course of
those conversations. Such an extension is supported neither in law nor in logic and is
rejected.”); Harper-Wyman Co. v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., No. 86 C 9595, 1991 WL 62510,
at *6 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 17, 1991) (“This is problematical, as communications between joint
plaintiffs or joint defendants outside of counsel’s presence are not protected under the joint
defense theory.”).
256. See, e.g., Gucci Am., Inc. v. Gucci, No. 07 Civ 6820(RMB)(JCF), 2008 WL 5251989,
at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2008) (“If information that is otherwise privileged is shared between
parties that have a common legal interest, the privilege is not forfeited even though no
attorney either creates or receives that communication.”); see also discussion infra Part V.F.4.
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lawyer setting to prove the existence of a common interest that the
257
communication furthers. Though an acceptable common interest is a
more limited level of interest than in the joint client representation
258
setting, there is no agreement as to the appropriate level of common
259
interest required.
Courts also disagree about the required level of intention to
260
cooperate. Some courts require proof of an intention to cooperate
while other courts seem to assume an intention to cooperate simply by
261
the fact of the communication.
If a court determines that the attorney–client privilege applies in an
allied lawyer setting, courts agree that the privilege cannot be waived
without the consent of all parties in the allied lawyer shared interest
262
group. If the parties become embroiled in a matter in an adversarial
posture, courts do not apply the privilege between the formerly
263
cooperating parties.
B. The Restatement Approach
The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, in section
76, entitled “The Privilege In Common–Interest Arrangements,”

257. See Teleglobe Commc’ns Corp., 493 F.3d at 364; see also RICE, supra note 19, § 4:35.
258. See supra Part IV.A for a discussion of the common interest inherent in a joint
client representation. With regard to the allied lawyer setting, Mueller and Kirkpatrick state,
“[E]ach client has her own lawyer, and it is understood that their common interest is limited
and they are already (or potentially) adversaries on other related matters, in a situation in
which a single lawyer could not properly represent both.” MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra
note 72, § 5:20, at 571.
259. See discussion infra Part V.G.1; see also RICE, supra note 19, § 4:36 (“There is no
clear standard for measuring the community of interests that must exist for the privilege to
apply.”).
260. See, e.g., Hunton & Williams v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 590 F.3d 272, 285 (4th Cir.
2010) (stating, in referring to an agreement to collaborate, “While agreement need not
assume a particular form, an agreement there must be”).
261. See, e.g., Hunydee v. United States, 355 F.2d 183, 185 (9th Cir. 1965) (no mention of
any agreement); see also discussion infra Part V.F.2.
262. See RICE, supra note 19, § 4:35 (stating “individual participants in the joint defense
arrangement generally cannot unilaterally waive the privilege protection”); see also Wagar v.
Gamache, No.1:06-MC-127(LEK/RFT), 2006 WL 3699544, at *12 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 2006)
(stating “the essential benefit of such joint collaboration is that a member of the common
legal enterprise cannot reveal the contents of the shared communications without the consent
of all the parties” (citation omitted)).
263. See In re Teleglobe Commc’ns Corp., 493 F.3d 345, 366 (3d Cir. 2007); see also
RICE, supra note 19, § 4:35.
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provides a definition of the situation in which the privilege applies.
Section 76 states,
(1) If two or more clients with a common interest in a
litigated or nonlitigated matter are represented by separate
lawyers and they agree to exchange information concerning the
matter, a communication of any such client that otherwise
qualifies as privileged under §§ 68–72 that relates to the matter is
privileged as against third persons. Any such client may invoke
the privilege, unless it has been waived by the client who made
the communication.
(2) Unless the clients have agreed otherwise, a
communication described in Subsection (1) is not privileged as
between clients described in Subsection (1) in a subsequent
265
adverse proceeding between them.

One of the great benefits of this section of the Restatement is that, in
combination with section 75 (which deals with the joint client
266
representation setting), it attempts to separate the allied lawyer and
joint client representation situations. This is an improvement on the
present state of affairs in the courts since many courts do not distinguish
267
the two settings and attempt to treat the two situations identically.
Section 76 treats the allied lawyer situation very similarly to the joint
client representation setting, however. The privilege applies if the
268
parties agree to exchange information, if the parties have a “common
interest,” and if all parties agree to a waiver for disclosure to occur. A
party can waive the privilege protection with regard to his or her own
statements but only to the extent that communication does not reveal

264. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 76 (2000).
265. Id.
266. See supra notes 177–178 and accompanying text.
267. In discussing the confusion of the joint client representation setting and the allied
lawyer setting, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, in In re Teleglobe Commc’ns Corp., noted
that the matter before it involved parties with a common attorney and so the trial court had
erred in ruling that the parties were “in a ‘community of interest.’” 493 F.3d at 363 n.18. The
court continued, “Indeed, much of the caselaw confuses the community-of-interest privilege
(which is the same as the ‘common interest privilege’) with the co-client privilege.” Id.
(citation omitted); see also discussion supra Part IV.B.4.
268. Comment c to section 76 of the Restatement clarifies that a formal agreement is not
required. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 76 cmt. c.
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269

protected communications of others.
As with the situation of joint
clients, there is no privilege between these parties in later adversarial
matters with regard to communications involving the matter of common
270
interest. In disagreement with some courts, the Restatement requires
that the communication involve a lawyer; a communication between
271
clients without a lawyer present cannot be privileged.
In an attempt to define what is a “common interest” in the allied
lawyer setting, the Restatement explains, “The communication must
relate to the common interest, which may be either legal, factual, or
strategic in character. The interests of the separately represented clients
272
need not be entirely congruent.” Thus, the Restatement definition of
common interest is broad, which is in contrast to the view of some
273
courts.
Unfortunately, the Restatement uses the phrase “common interest”
to describe the interest in a joint client representation setting and also to
describe the interest that parties must share in an allied lawyer
274
situation.
One might, therefore, assume that the same level of
“common interest” is required in both settings. Yet, the reality is that
the shared interest necessary for a joint client representation to occur is
more aligned than is true in many, if not all, allied lawyer situations.
The common interest present with joint clients must be close to identical
because otherwise the attorney cannot ethically handle a joint
275
representation.
This certainly cannot be said regarding the allied
269. See id. § 76 cmt. g (“[A]ny member may waive the privilege with respect to that
person’s own communications. . . .
If a document or other recording embodies
communications from two or more members, a waiver is effective only if concurred in by all
members whose communications are involved, unless an objecting member’s communication
can be redacted.”).
270. See id. §§ 76(2), 76 cmt. f.
271. See id. § 76 cmt. d.
272. Id. § 76 cmt. e.
273. See discussion infra Part V.F.1.
274. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 75(1)
(“If two or more persons are jointly represented by the same lawyer in a matter, a
communication of either co-client that . . . relates to matters of common interest is privileged
as against third persons.” (emphasis added)), with id. § 76(1) (“If two or more clients with a
common interest in a litigated or nonlitigated matter are represented by separate lawyers and
they agree to exchange information concerning the matter, a communication of any such
client that otherwise qualifies as privileged under §§ 68–72 that relates to the matter is
privileged as against third persons.” (emphasis added)).
275. See discussion supra Part IV.A.2; see also In re Teleglobe Commc’ns Corp., 493
F.3d 345, 366 (3d Cir. 2007) (stating that “common interest” in the joint representation
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lawyer context. As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals stated in In re
Teleglobe Communications Corp. regarding the allied lawyer context,
“because the clients have separate attorneys, courts can afford to relax
the degree to which clients’ interests must converge without worrying
that their attorneys’ ability to represent them zealously and single276
mindedly will suffer.”
C. The Representational Posture
1. Lack of an Attorney–Client Relationship Under the Traditional
Approach for Recognition of a Relationship
Applying the privilege to communications in the allied lawyer setting
greatly increases the wingspan of privilege protection in a way that does
not occur in the joint client representation setting. In a joint client
setting, all privileged communications are between an attorney and his
or her clients. This is not true in the allied lawyer setting.
277
The Virginia Supreme Court in Chahoon v. Commonwealth
viewed each attorney present for the key communications with the
defendants as representing all three defendants even though each
278
defendant had engaged a separate attorney.
In fact, the attorney
engaged by the defendant whose communications were at issue was not
present. The court stated that “the counsel of each was in effect the
counsel of all, though, for purposes of convenience, he was employed
279
and paid by his respective client.”
The Chahoon court erred in such a conclusion. A lawyer in an allied
lawyer setting represents and therefore has an attorney–client
relationship with only those persons who honestly and reasonably
280
believe they are represented by that lawyer. The traditional test used

scenario means “legal interests must be identical (or nearly so) in order that an attorney can
represent them all with the candor, vigor, and loyalty that our ethics require”); Fed. Deposit
Ins. Co. v. Ogden Corp., 202 F.3d 454, 461 (1st Cir. 2000) (“The term ‘common interest’
typically entails an identical (or nearly identical) legal interest as opposed to a merely similar
interest.”).
276. 493 F.3d at 366.
277. 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 822 (1871).
278. Id. at 842.
279. Id.
280. See Merck Eprova AG v. ProThera, Inc., 670 F. Supp. 2d 201, 210 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)
(“‘The formation of an attorney–client relationship hinges upon the client’s [reasonable]
belief that he is consulting a lawyer in that capacity and his manifested intention to seek
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by courts in all sorts of settings for the determination of the existence of
an attorney–client relationship has long been the honest and reasonable
281
belief of the person in the position of client. This is supported by the
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, which states in
Section 14 that
A relationship of client and lawyer arises when:
(1) a person manifests to a lawyer the person’s intent that the
lawyer provide legal services for the person; and either
(a) the lawyer manifests to the person consent to do so; or
(b) the lawyer fails to manifest lack of consent to do so,
and the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the
person reasonably relies on the lawyer to provide the
services; or
(2) a tribunal with power to do so appoints the lawyer to
282
provide the services.
283

While courts generally do not require an express agreement, courts
are very likely to find an attorney–client relationship if such an
284
agreement exists. In contrast, in the allied lawyer setting there may be
professional legal advice.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Diversified Grp., Inc. v.
Daugerdas, 139 F. Supp. 2d 445, 454 (S.D.N.Y. 2001))).
281. See Boston Scientific Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson Inc., 647 F. Supp. 2d 369, 373 (D.
Del. 2009) (“Under Delaware law, where there is no express contract or formal retainer
agreement evidencing an attorney–client relationship, ‘courts look at the contacts between
the potential clients and its potential lawyers to determine whether it would have been
reasonable for the “client” to believe that the attorney was acting on its behalf as counsel.’”
(quoting Benchmark Capital Partners IV, L.P. v. Vague, No. C.A. 19719-NC, 2002 WL
31057462, at *3 (Del. Ch. Sept. 3, 2002))); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Kreamer, 946 A.2d
500, 521 (Md. 2008) (“Rather, ‘[t]he relationship may arise by implication from a client’s
reasonable expectation of legal representation and the attorney’s failure to dispel those
expectations.’” (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Brooke, 821 A.2d 414, 425 (Md.
2003))); John V. Heutsche Co. L.P.A. v. McNea, 905 N.E.2d 1303, 1306 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 2008)
(“Whether or not an attorney–client relationship was created ‘turns largely on the reasonable
belief of the prospective client.’” (quoting Cuyahoga County Bar Ass’n v. Hardiman, 798
N.E.2d 369, 373 (Ohio 2003))). See generally Ingrid A. Minott, Note, The Attorney–Client
Relationship: Exploring the Unintended Consequences of Inadvertent Formation, 86 U. DET.
MERCY L. REV. 269 (2009).
282. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 14 (2000).
283. See, e.g., Tinn v. EMM Labs, Inc., 556 F. Supp. 2d 1191, 1192 (D. Or. 2008)
(recognizing that no express written or oral contract is necessary); Smith v. State, 905 A.2d
315, 325–26 (Md. 2006) (noting that no express agreement is necessary).
284. See, e.g., Avocent Redmond Corp. v. Rose Elecs., 491 F. Supp. 2d 1000, 1004–06
(W.D. Wash. 2007) (noting that engagement agreement said law firm represented a
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an express agreement that no lawyer in the arrangement represents any
285
client other than the one he or she represents separately. If there is
such an agreement, the members of the joint effort cannot argue
successfully that they honestly and reasonably believe that they are
represented not only by their individually selected separate attorneys
but also the attorneys separately engaged by other members of the joint
effort.
Other circumstances, such as statements by a lawyer that he or she
represents members of the group other than his or her separate client,
could create an honest and reasonable belief on the part of those
members of the group that the attorney represents the other members
of the group. Likewise, the fact that a lawyer renders individual legal
advice to a member of the group other than his or her separate client
could create in that member an honest and reasonable belief in
representation and thus in the existence of an attorney–client
corporation “and its affiliates” and so the affiliate’s claim of representation was reasonable);
see also Johnson v. Schultz, 671 S.E.2d 559, 569 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009), aff’d, 691 S.E.2d 701
(N.C. 2010) (“‘[T]he relation of attorney and client may be implied from the conduct of the
parties, and is not dependent on the payment of a fee, nor upon the execution of a formal
contract.’” (quoting N.C. State Bar v. Sheffield, 326 S.E.2d 320, 325 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985))).
285. For example, ABA Formal Opinion 95-395 notes that the joint defense consortium
agreement being considered there stated that the lawyers for the separate members of the
consortium did not represent any other members of the consortium. ABA Comm. on Ethics
& Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-395 (1995). Alan Kornberg provided a sample
published provision of such an agreement:
Nothing contained herein shall be deemed to create an attorney–client relationship
between Law Firm 1 (counsel to Creditor 1) and Creditor 2, or between Law Firm 2
(counsel to Creditor 2) and Creditor 1, or to affect the separate and independent
representation of each Party by its respective counsel according to what such
counsel believes to be in his or her client’s best interest. After full opportunity to
advise and confer with their respective counsel, each of the Parties represent that
each waives any right to seek disqualification of the other Party’s counsel in any
matter now pending or hereinafter commenced, based on such counsel’s receipt or
disclosure of Confidential Information pursuant to this Agreement, nor shall any
counsel to a Party be disqualified from examining or cross-examining any other
Party who testifies in any proceeding (now pending or hereinafter commenced)
because of such Party’s participation in this Agreement or because such counsel
may subsequently execute an amendment to this Agreement in accordance with
Section 12.
Alan W. Kornberg, Sample Common Interest and Confidentiality Agreement, in RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS IN DISTRESSED DEBT, RESTRUCTURINGS AND WORKOUTS—FALLOUT
FROM THE CREDIT CRUNCH 2008, at 81, 86–87 (2008); see also 1 JOEL M. ANDROPHY,
WHITE COLLAR CRIME § 3:60 (2d ed. 2011) (sample joint defense agreement containing a
provision denying the existence of an attorney–client relationship).
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286

relationship and all its burdens and benefits.
In the typical allied
lawyer situation, an attorney for one member of the group does not
make statements or behave in a manner that would cause other
members of the group to have an honest and reasonable belief that the
attorney represents not only his or her separate client, but also other
members of the group. This is especially true if the group members
have an agreement which states that each lawyer involved represents
only that lawyer’s separate client.
In contrast, conflicts of interest of various sorts and degrees are
287
common in allied lawyer settings.
Frequently, the conflicts are such
that no one attorney could ethically represent more than one member of
the joint effort—hence the use of separate lawyers. Such conflicts, if
sufficiently obvious, are an indication that no person in the joint effort
can have an honest and reasonable belief of an attorney–client
relationship with an attorney separately representing another party in
288
the joint effort.
The result of the proper application of this law regarding the
formation of the attorney–client relationship is that a lawyer does not
represent all parties in a cooperative group simply by virtue of their
membership in the cooperative group. A lawyer does not have, by
virtue of the cooperation, an attorney–client relationship with parties in
a cooperative group. A lawyer involved in an allied lawyer setting may
286. A person paying a lawyer for his or her services has a stronger argument that he or
she honestly and reasonably believed that the attorney represented the person and thus that
they were in an attorney–client relationship. An attorney–client relationship can be formed
and recognized, however, without payment. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee
Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 1317 (7th Cir. 1978) (a professional relationship does not depend on the
payment of fees); Tinn, 556 F. Supp. 2d at 1192 (same); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v.
Shoup, 979 A.2d 120, 136 (Md. 2009) (“Our cases make clear that an explicit agreement or
payment arrangement is not a prerequisite to the formation of an attorney–client
relationship.”).
287. See Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 250 F.R.D. 575, 579
(D. Colo. 2007) (“Even if there is adversity between some of the parties to the common
interest agreement, they still may invoke the joint defense privilege to protect
communications from disclosure to third parties.”); see also JEROME G. SNIDER ET AL.,
CORPORATE PRIVILEGES & CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION § 4.02(3)(a) (2010) (discussing
the probability of adverse interests in the allied lawyer setting).
288. The court in Harry A. v. Duncan stated, “‘Where appropriate, due consideration
should be given to the unreasonableness of a claimed expectation of entering a [sic] into a coclient status when a significant and readily apparent conflict of interest exists between the
organization or other client and the associated person or entity claimed to be a co-client.’”
330 F. Supp. 2d 1133, 1141 (D. Mont. 2004) (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 14 cmt. f (2000)).
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owe other, nonclient parties in the group fiduciary duties that may flow
from the joint effort and sharing of information, but the attorney does
not have a true attorney–client relationship with those parties absent
other conduct creating an honest and reasonable belief of an attorney–
289
client relationship.
At all times in the allied lawyer situation, such an attorney focuses
on maximizing the ultimate outcome for his or her separate client. One
can say that the attorney is acting in the best interest of all members of
the joint effort, but such an attorney, at any particular point in the joint
effort, is always evaluating the situation to determine whether the joint
effort is in the best interest of his or her own client. When the better
course is for the individual member to exit the joint effort, the lawyer
will so counsel his or her client. So even in the midst of the joint effort,
a lawyer for any one member of the joint effort has one eye clearly
focused on the individual interests of the attorney’s separate client.
2. ABA Formal Opinion 95-395: No Attorney–Client Relationship
290

In ABA Formal Opinion 95-395, the American Bar Association’s
Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility
considered the nature of the relationship of an attorney and members of
291
a joint defense consortium, an allied lawyer setting. While speculating
that an attorney in an allied lawyer situation may owe members of the
group fiduciary duties, the Opinion does not view the other members of
292
the group as clients of the lawyer.
Consistent with recognizing the
absence of an attorney–client relationship, the Opinion clearly states
that the lawyer owes no ethical duties to the members of the group
293
other than the lawyer’s separate client.
The Opinion discusses these matters while focusing on the question
of possible conflicts of interest created by the joint consortium with
294
regard to a lawyer who no longer represents any member of the group.
First, the Opinion addresses obligations the lawyer might have as a
289. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-395, at 1 (1995);
see also United States v. Stepney, 246 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1083 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (stating a
search of cases did not recognize that joint defense agreement created “a true attorney–client
relationship or a general duty of loyalty”).
290. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-395.
291. See id. at 1.
292. See id. at 5.
293. See id.
294. See id. at 2.
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result of his duties to his former separate client. The Opinion states
that a lawyer who has confidential information from members of the
consortium other than his separate client “might owe an obligation to
his former client not to disclose the information by reason of the former
296
client’s obligation to the other members.”
If the former client
consented to disclosure, the “[l]awyer would almost surely have a
fiduciary obligation to the other members of the consortium, which
297
might well lead to his disqualification.”
The lawyer’s fiduciary
obligation, in the view of the ABA Committee, arises from the law of
298
agency. The lawyer’s client might be viewed as an agent of the other
members of the consortium and the lawyer, when he came upon the
299
information, was a “sub-agent” of the lawyer’s client.
The lawyer’s
obligation to protect the information of the nonclient consortium
member thus would be derivative of the client’s obligation to that
300
member.
The ABA Opinion clarifies, however, that the lawyer
“would not, however, owe an ethical obligation” to the other members
of the consortium “for there is simply no provision of the Model Rules
301
imposing such an obligation.”

295. See id.
296. Id. at 4.
297. Id. at 5. The Opinion cites Wilson P. Abraham Construction Corp. v. Armco Steel
Corp., 559 F.2d 250 (5th Cir. 1977), in which co-defendants of an attorney’s client in a prior
matter sought to have the attorney disqualified. 559 F.2d at 251. The co-defendants were all
accused of criminal conspiracy in an antitrust context. Id. at 252. The court stated, “In such a
situation, an attorney who is the recipient of such information breaches his fiduciary duty if
he later, in his representation of another client, is able to use this information to the
detriment of one of the co-defendants.” Id. at 253. The court did not have enough
information about what had been shared with the attorney to make a disqualification
determination. Id.
298. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-395, at 5 n.3.
299. Id. The Opinion cites an early draft of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 132 cmt. g(ii) (2000), which, in final form, states,
A lawyer who learns confidential information from a person represented by
another lawyer pursuant to a common-interest sharing arrangement (see § 76) is
precluded from a later representation adverse to the former sharing person when
information actually shared by that person with the lawyer or the lawyer’s client is
material and relevant to the later matter (see Illustration 8, above). Such a
threatened use of shared information is inconsistent with the undertaking of
confidentiality that is part of such an arrangement.
Id. § 132 cmt. g(ii).
300. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-395, at 5.
301. Id.
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3. Disqualification Law: No Attorney–Client Relationship
Courts dealing with questions of disqualification resulting from
allied lawyer situations agree that an attorney in an allied lawyer
situation does not have an attorney–client relationship with the
302
members of the group. For example, in United States v. Stepney, the
District Court for the Northern District of California, when dealing with
a disqualification issue arising from an allied lawyer setting, clarified
that an attorney in such a situation does not represent members of the
303
group other than the lawyer’s separate client. In discussing Wilson P.
304
Abraham Construction Corp. v. Armco Steel Corp., another case
addressing disqualification arising from an allied lawyer situation, the
Stepney court stated,
Despite the analogy to attorney–client relationships, the
Abraham Construction court did not treat the attorney’s
participation in a joint defense agreement as identical to formal
representation of a client. Had plaintiff’s attorney actually
represented [the group member], he would have been
disqualified automatically on the irrebuttable presumption that
he had gained confidences during the prior representation on a
related matter. Finding that there had been “no direct attorney–
client relationship,” the court refused to presume that plaintiff’s
attorney had obtained confidential information in the course of
the joint defense. The court instead placed the burden on the
party moving for disqualification to prove that the plaintiff’s
attorney had actually been privy to confidential information. . . .
. . . While a joint defense agreement does impose a duty of
confidentiality, that duty is limited in that the showing required
to establish a conflict of interest arising from prior participation
in a joint defense agreement is significantly higher than that
required to make out a conflict based on former representation
305
of a client.
Thus, the Stepney and Abraham Construction courts, for purposes of
conflict-of-interest disqualification, applied a different analysis to the
302. 246 F. Supp. 2d 1069 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
303. Id. at 1076.
304. 559 F.2d 250 (5th Cir. 1977).
305. Stepney, 246 F. Supp. 2d at 1076 (quoting Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp., 559
F.2d at 253 (citations omitted)).
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allied lawyer setting than to a situation in which a lawyer once
represented the party in question. Clearly, these courts did not view an
attorney in an allied lawyer setting as having an attorney–client
relationship with the members of the group other than the attorney’s
separate client.
When facing disqualification issues, other courts similarly have not
viewed an attorney in an allied lawyer situation as having an attorney–
client relationship with the members of the group other than the
member separately represented by the lawyer.
These courts’
disqualification analyses proceed by focusing on the information
actually obtained by the lawyer, not on the basis of presumptions of
information flow that would arise if an attorney–client relationship
existed between the lawyer and the members of the group in an allied
306
lawyer setting.
4. Conclusion: No Attorney–Client Relationship for Purposes of
Privilege
The law regarding the recognition of the existence of an attorney–
client relationship makes clear that an attorney in an allied lawyer
situation does not have an attorney–client relationship with the other
members of the group simply as a result of the joint effort. ABA
Opinion 95-395 expresses the view that such a lawyer does not have an
attorney–client relationship with members of the group even though the
lawyer may owe the nonclient members of the joint effort a derivative
307
fiduciary duty to keep information confidential.
Also, the courts, in
dealing with disqualification questions, have required a higher level of
proof when the claimed disqualification arises from an allied lawyer
308
setting.
These courts have not presumed that a lawyer was privy to
confidential information of the group’s members as such a court would
presume if the court believed that the lawyer represented the party and
309
thus had an attorney–client relationship with the party.
306. Subsequent courts have followed suit in requiring a showing that the attorney
actually obtained confidences before disqualifying counsel. See, e.g., Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell
Oil Co., 566 F.2d 602, 608 (8th Cir. 1977); Essex Chem. Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem.
Co., 993 F. Supp. 241, 251–52 (D.N.J. 1998); GTE N., Inc. v. Apache Prods. Co., 914 F. Supp.
1575, 1580 (N.D. Ill. 1996). See generally Arnold Rochvarg, Joint Defense Agreements and
Disqualification of Co-Defendant’s Counsel, 22 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 311 (1998).
307. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-395 (1995).
308. See supra Part V.C.3.
309. See supra Part V.C.3.
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Likewise, attorney–client privilege law should not treat an attorney
in an allied lawyer setting as having an attorney–client relationship with
all members of the group. As these other areas of law make clear, the
Chahoon court was not correct in concluding that a lawyer in an allied
310
lawyer setting represents the members of the group.
Absent the
attorney–client relationship, there is no basis for applying the privilege
in the allied lawyer setting.
D. An Expansion of the Privilege Contrary to Traditional Privilege
Doctrine
In the allied lawyer setting, many communications that are not
between an attorney and client enjoy the protection of the privilege and
thus are not subject to compelled disclosure. This is a broad expansion
of the character of communications not presentable to the truth-finder
and a substantial increase in the quantity of communications not subject
to disclosure and not available to the truth-finder.
This expansion of the reach of the attorney–client privilege
contradicts the long held and much repeated mantra that courts should
311
apply the privilege narrowly.
In University of Pennsylvania v.
312
EEOC, the United States Supreme Court contemplated whether to
recognize a privilege for peer review. The Court acknowledged that, in
light of the fact that recognition of a privilege keeps evidence from the
truth-finder, “[w]e do not create and apply an evidentiary privilege
310. The Chahoon court stated, “[T]he counsel of each was in effect the counsel of all,
though, for purposes of convenience, he was employed and paid by his respective client.” 62
Va. (21 Gratt.) 822, 842 (1871). Having established the relationship, the court found
communications in the allied lawyer setting to be privileged, stating “confidential
communications from client to counsel, during the existence of this relationship, and about a
professional matter, are privileged.” Id. at 843.
311. See, e.g., Clarke v. Am. Commerce Nat’l Bank, 974 F.2d 127, 129 (9th Cir. 1992)
(“Because the attorney–client privilege has the effect of withholding relevant information
from the factfinder, it is applied only when necessary to achieve its limited purpose of
encouraging full and frank disclosure by the client to his or her attorney.”); Harrisburg Auth.
v. CIT Capital USA, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 2d 380, 387 (M.D. Pa. 2010) (“‘It is well established
that evidentiary privileges . . . are generally disfavored and should be narrowly construed.’
The attorney client privilege is one such evidentiary privilege.” (quoting Pa. Dep’t. of Transp.
v. Taylor, 841 A.2d 108, 118 (Pa. 2004))); Sieger v. Zak, 874 N.Y.S.2d 535, 537 (App. Div.
2009) (“Since the attorney–client privilege constitutes an obstacle to the truth-finding process,
however, the protection claimed must be narrowly construed, and its application must be
consistent with the purposes underlying the immunity.” (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted)).
312. 493 U.S. 182 (1990).
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unless it ‘promotes sufficiently important interests to outweigh the need
313
for probative evidence.’”
The Court noted that because privileges
314
In
block evidence, any such privilege must “‘be strictly construed.’”
315
Virmani v. Novant Health Inc., the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit cautioned:
When considering whether to recognize a privilege, a court must
begin with “the primary assumption that there is a general duty
to give what testimony one is capable of giving, and that any
exemptions which may exist are distinctly exceptional, being so
316
many derogations from a positive general rule.”
Recognizing the application of the attorney–client privilege in the
allied lawyer setting does not “‘promote[] sufficiently important
317
interests to outweigh the need for probative evidence.’”
Not only is this an expansion of attorney–client privilege law, but
recognizing the privilege in the allied lawyer setting has no basis in the
318
common law. As explained above, applying the privilege to the allied
319
lawyer setting is a relatively recent occurrence. Only four cases before
320
1966 did so. Such an application of the privilege is not so engrained in
our judicial firmament such that a rejection of it would wreak havoc on
the judicial system.
E. Lack of Supporting Rationale
Perhaps the expansion of the privilege could be justified if the
expansion captured a significant benefit. For example, if applying the
privilege in the allied lawyer setting furthered the rationale of the
privilege itself, then the expansion might be justified. But it does not.
313. Id. at 189 (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980)).
314. Id. (quoting Trammel, 445 U.S. at 50).
315. 259 F.3d 284 (4th Cir. 2001).
316. Id. at 287 (quoting Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 9 (1996)).
317. Univ. of Pa., 493 U.S. at 189 (quoting Trammel, 445 U.S. at 51).
318. See Lerner, supra note 6, at 1514 (“[I]t is plainly a departure from the traditional
privilege rules.”).
319. See supra Part III.C.
320. The four cases are Chahoon v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 822 (1871);
Schmitt v. Emery, 2 N.W.2d 413, 417 (Minn. 1942); Continental Oil Co. v. United States, 330
F.2d 347, 349 (9th Cir. 1964); and Hunydee v. United States, 355 F.2d 183, 185 (9th Cir. 1965).
For an in-depth discussion of these cases, see supra Parts III.A–.B.
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The rationale of the privilege is to create an environment of superior
legal advice by encouraging client disclosure to the client’s attorney. In
the allied lawyer setting, the clients are not disclosing anything new to
their own attorneys. Applying the privilege in the allied lawyer setting
321
does not, therefore, further attorney–client communications.
Even so, the expansion of the privilege might be justified if it created
a benefit that outweighed the harm from keeping information from the
truth-finder. There is no such rationale.
Rationales that have been suggested revolve around claims of
322
323
effectiveness and efficiency.
For example, the Restatement (Third)
of the Law Governing Lawyers presents its rationale for applying the
privilege in the allied lawyer setting thusly:
The rule . . . permits persons who have common interests to
coordinate their positions without destroying the privileged
status of their communications with their lawyers. For example,

321. See United States v. Almeida, 341 F.3d 1318, 1324 (11th Cir. 2003) (“When a
defendant conveys information to the lawyer of his co-defendant, as opposed to his own
lawyer, the justification for protecting the confidentiality of the information is weak. The
policy of fostering frank communication with an attorney is already facilitated by privileging
those communications made to the defendant’s own attorney; little can be gained by
extending the privilege to those communications made to attorneys that do not represent the
defendant.”); see also Lerner, supra note 6, at 1480 (“[S]haring of client confidences with
another attorney does not accord with the attorney–client privilege because it in no sense
furthers a client’s ability to confide in his attorney.”).
322. See, e.g., United States v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 492 F.3d 806, 816 (7th Cir. 2007)
(“Applying the common interest doctrine to the full range of communications otherwise
protected by the attorney–client privilege encourages parties with a shared legal interest to
seek legal ‘assistance in order to meet legal requirements and to plan their conduct’
accordingly. This planning serves the public interest by advancing compliance with the law,
‘facilitating the administration of justice’ and averting litigation. Reason and experience
demonstrate that joint venturers, no less than individuals, benefit from planning their
activities based on sound legal advice predicated upon open communication.” (quoting In re
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 101 F.3d 1386, 1391 (Fed. Cir. 1996))); Lugosch v. Congel, 219
F.R.D. 220, 238 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) (stating that “joint defense agreements present a pooling of
resources, a healthy exchange of vital information, a united front against a common litigious
foe, and the marshaling of legal talent and advice”); see also Lerner, supra note 6, at 1479
(stating that the privilege allows “more effective legal representation than would be possible
without the disclosures”); Rushing, supra note 247, at 1274 (noting that cooperation is often
required for effective legal representation); Schaffzin, Common Interest, supra note 247, at 60
(noting court opinions that find the privilege encourages communication between parties so
that the parties receive effective representation).
323. See, e.g., Mahaffey, supra note 247, at 28–29 (allows for a more efficient
representation).
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where conflict of interest disqualifies a lawyer from representing
two co-defendants in a criminal case . . ., the separate lawyers
representing them may exchange confidential communications
to prepare their defense without loss of the privilege. Clients
thus can elect separate representation while maintaining the
324
privilege in cooperating on common elements of interest.
Ultimately, both clients and the “system . . . benefit[] . . . since
enabling cooperation is likely to save court time as common strategies
325
are put into play.”
The argument is that “collaborative
communications . . . will not likely happen at all if there is no
326
privilege.”
Most courts do not mention a rationale for applying the privilege in
the allied lawyer setting, though a few do. For example, in Continental
Oil Co. v. United States, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized
application of the privilege after the claimants of the privilege had
argued that the communications were intended “to make their
327
representation of their clients . . . more effective.” And, in Hunydee v.
United States, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that the
privilege applied when the communications “are intended to facilitate
328
representation.”

324. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 76 cmt. b (2000);
see also MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 72, § 5:20, at 571 (“The reason to apply the
privilege in this setting is to make it possible for clients with separate lawyers to cooperate in
the development of common positions.”).
325. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 72, § 5:20, at 571.
326. Id.
327. 330 F.2d 347, 348–49 (9th Cir. 1964).
328. 355 F.2d 183, 185 (9th Cir. 1965). See also In re Condemnation City of Phila., where
the court stated,
As a policy matter, the joint defense doctrine is highly desirable because it
allows for greater efficiency in the handling of litigation. Frequently, codefendants with essentially the same interests must retain separate counsel to
avoid potential conflicts over contingent or subsidiary issues in the case. To
avoid duplication of efforts, such defendants should be able to pool their
resources on matters of common interest. This can be done most effectively if
both counsel can attend and participate in interviews with each other’s
clients. . . . With multi-party cases becoming so frequent, and with litigation
costs spiraling upwards—some would say out of control, the courts should not
deny defendants the ability to pool their resources and coordinate their efforts
on issues of common interest.
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While it is possible that applying the privilege to the allied lawyer
setting creates efficiencies in representation, it is also very possible that
recognition of the privilege in this setting does no such thing. When
parties join together in a common effort but with separate lawyers, it is
true that the attorneys can divide up the needed work on the matter; not
every client must pay to have its separate attorney complete every step.
But work on a legal matter is not finite. More lawyers may mean that
more work is done. The lawyers may not divide the work. Even if work
is divided, each lawyer must remain wary and cautious, and must take
on a monitoring function regarding the work done by lawyers for the
other members of the joint endeavor. One cannot say that each client
pays less or that each lawyer bills fewer hours in an allied lawyer context
329
than when parties and counsel act separately.
It is possible that applying the privilege to the allied lawyer setting
creates efficiencies with regard to the justice system as a whole. It is also
very possible that recognition of the privilege in this setting does not
decrease systemic costs in any way. Parties working together are not
likely to present inconsistent positions and therefore judicial
proceedings may be less lengthy, but such is not a foregone conclusion.
The same amount of judicial resources may be used in a joint endeavor
situation with separate lawyers. The opposition may simply require
more judicial resources to develop its position as a result of the united
330
front of the parties working jointly.
And certainly this efficiency
argument fails when the parties elect to dissolve the joint endeavor.
When the parties are not involved in a litigation matter, any suggestion
of systemic benefit is even weaker.
At least one commentator has argued that recognition of the
privilege in the allied lawyer setting involving a criminal matter is a
331
constitutionally required benefit. The argument is that the privilege is
necessary to protect defendants’ Sixth Amendment right to counsel
981 A.2d 391, 397 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2009) (alteration in original) (quoting Young v.
Presbyterian Homes Inc., 50 Pa. D. & C. 4th 190, 198 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 2001)).
329. See Lerner, supra note 6, at 1528–30 (joint effort allows for multiplying of work by
lawyers).
330. See id. at 1530 (positing that in the criminal context additional prosecutorial
resources may be required as prosecutors have to access other evidence because cooperation
with the prosecutors may decrease as the result of a joint endeavor by the defendants).
331. See, e.g., Bartel, supra note 6, at 872–73; see also Cont’l Oil Co. v. United States, 330
F.2d 347, 350 (9th Cir. 1964) (noting that the joint defense doctrine is a “vital and important
part of the client’s right to representation by counsel”).
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because a fair trial is only possible if defendants have an “unpenalized
332
opportunity to coordinate the defense.”
No federal court has so
333
But a Pennsylvania court has recognized that prosecutorial
held.
intrusion into an allied lawyer setting could be a violation of the Sixth
Amendment. In Commonwealth v. Scarfo, the court stated,
The possibility that intrusions may occur heightens when
multiple parties are the subject of a group defense. In such a
case it would be reasonable for a defendant to assume that the
other defendants are allied with him or her and that the
confidentiality of statements made for the benefit of group
preparation would stay confidential within the group until the
appropriate time for disclosure, perhaps at trial. “Defendants
have both the right to prepare a group defense and the right to
communicate privately with counsel; constitutional principles
forbid requiring a defendant to waive one of these rights in order
334
to exercise the other.”
Even so, this statement is not a recognition of a constitutional right
to application of the attorney–client privilege to the allied lawyer
scenario when prosecutorial intrusion is not an issue. There is, of
course, no constitutional right argument in the civil context.
Perhaps the strongest argument of a benefit gained from applying
the attorney–client privilege to the allied lawyer setting is that

332. See Bartel, supra note 6, at 871–73.
333. In United States v. Jones, 44 F.3d 860, 873 (10th Cir. 1995), the court evaluated a
claim by a defendant that he had been denied effective assistance of counsel by not being able
to confer with counsel of other defendants. The court found no merit in the argument
because the defendant had the opportunity to confer. Id. The court did not address whether
such a denial would in fact be an affront to the Sixth Amendment because the factual basis
for the claim was lacking. Id.
334. 611 A.2d 242, 266 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (quoting Note, Government Intrusions into
the Defense Camp: Undermining the Right to Counsel, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1143, 1147 (1984));
see also In re Condemnation by City of Phila., 981 A.2d 391, 397 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2009). The
City of Philadelphia court, in a civil context, stated, “In Scarfo, our superior court held that
defendants have both the right to prepare a group defense and the right to communicate
privately with counsel. Constitutional principles forbid requiring a party to waive one of
these rights in order to exercise the other.” Id. at 397. Ultimately, the court did not apply the
privilege because the parties did not share a proper common interest. Id. at 398–99. In
United States v. Almeida, the Eleventh Circuit stated that “in light of the vast resources of the
government” in a prosecution, perhaps allowing privileged collaboration leveled the playing
field. 341 F.3d 1318, 1324 (11th Cir. 2003).
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recognition of the privilege creates an environment that encourages
parties to share information, thereby assisting their lawyers to provide
335
more effective representation.
This rationale differs from the
traditional attorney–client privilege rationale in that the attorney–client
privilege is intended to encourage attorney–client communication. That
communication is believed to lead to improved representation. The
rationale for applying the privilege to the allied lawyer setting is that
recognition of the privilege in the allied lawyer setting will allow for
cooperation between parties and increased communication such that the
representation of the client by the client’s separate lawyer will be
superior. It is possible that the increased communication between and
among the parties and their counsel creates a benefit in some cases (that
being more effective representation). But the connection between the
disclosure encouraged by the privilege and the improved representation
seems much weaker than is true in the regular attorney–client privilege
setting.
Even if applying the attorney–client privilege in the allied lawyer
situation creates some benefit, the damage inflicted to the truth-finding
336
mission of the justice system greatly outweighs that benefit. Applying
the privilege in the allied lawyer setting means many communications
are protected from disclosure that would not be protected otherwise.
Some of those communications may not have occurred absent the
promise of privilege protection, but some of those communications
335. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 902 F.2d 244, 249 (4th Cir. 1990) (“Whether
an action is ongoing or contemplated, whether the jointly interested persons are defendants
or plaintiffs, and whether the litigation or potential litigation is civil or criminal, the rationale
for the joint defense rule remains unchanged: persons who share a common interest in
litigation should be able to communicate with their respective attorneys and with each other
to more effectively prosecute or defend their claims.”); Fojtasek v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd., 262
F.R.D. 650, 656 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (quoting In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 902 F.2d at 249).
336. See James M. Fischer, The Attorney–Client Privilege Meets the Common Interest
Arrangement: Protecting Confidences While Exchanging Information for Mutual Gain, 16
REV. LITIG. 631, 650–51 (1997) (“Of course, recognition of the privilege means that
information relevant to the decision-making process is not accessible by all interested
individuals. Since the making of decisions with full information is generally understood to be
more desirable than the contrary, the cost of realizing the benefits of privilege recognition is
that the decision-making process may be less accurate than if decision-making were based on
all relevant information.”); see also Richard L. Marcus, The Perils of Privilege: Waiver and the
Litigator, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1605, 1641–42 (1986) (“At some point widespread circulation of
privileged information threatens to make a mockery of justice if, due to his inability to obtain
the information or offer it in evidence, the opponent is subjected to a judicial result that many
others (who do have the information) know to be wrong.”).
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337

undoubtedly would have occurred.
Charles Alan Wright and Kenneth W. Graham were correct in
stating, “[N]o one has ever made a convincing argument that strategy
sessions among co-defendants produce a benefit to the legal system that
338
outweighs the cost of the loss of evidence to the courts.”
As
eloquently stated by Professor Craig Lerner, “[N]ot everything that
improves legal representation is covered by the attorney–client
339
privilege.”
F. The Nuts and Bolts Problems in Courts’ Current Application of the
Privilege in the Allied Lawyer Setting
Even if the application of the privilege in the allied lawyer situation
could be justified, the current state of the law in applying the privilege is
340
impossibly confused and calls into question whether the privilege can
apply. This confusion undermines the certainty so necessary for any
privilege to accomplish its goals. If there is no certainty of application,
the privilege has no value because no one can know that a
341
communication is privileged when that communication occurs.
337. See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 8, § 5493 (noting that expansion of the
attorney–client privilege to allied lawyers “also reduces the flow of information to the
court”).
338. Id.; see also Mahaffey, supra note 5, at 684 (“Under a utilitarian approach, an alliedparty doctrine or common-interest rule (at least as between the government and relator in a
qui tam case) would be so expansive that the costs to the judicial process would outweigh any
societal benefit.”); Note, supra note 141, at 1034 (writing when only a few courts had
recognized application of the privilege in the allied lawyer setting, the student author
surmised, “the tactical advantage in an exchange of information among independently hired
attorneys might be deemed of insufficient social importance to justify an extension of the
privilege”).
339. Lerner, supra note 6, at 1480.
340. It would be hard to improve on Professor Lerner’s eloquent statement when
discussing the doctrine in the criminal context: “The joint defense privilege is characterized
today by a core certainty as to the existence of a privilege of some sort and a confounding
uncertainty as to the precise details.” Id. at 1490.
341. See Daniel J. Capra, The Attorney–Client Privilege in Common Representations,
TRIAL LAW. Q., Summer 1989, at 20, 21 (noting that confusion is costly because “it is crucial
for the attorney and client to know at the outset whether proposed communications are
within the privilege”); Schaffzin, Common Interest, supra note 247, at 65 (noting that there is
a great deal of uncertainty so parties are discouraged from disclosure); Garsombke, supra
note 247, at 620–21 (noting that reliance is impossible because the application is so confused);
see also Gregory J. Kopta, Comment, Applying the Attorney–Client Privilege and Work
Product Privileges to Allied Party Exchange of Information in California, 36 UCLA L. REV.
151, 153 (1988) (“Continuing uncertainty exacts a high price. Fear of waiver in general is very
expensive to both the participants and the legal system itself.”).

08-GIESEL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

552

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

3/20/2012 2:05 PM

[95:475

1. Common Interest Confusion
One source of this confusion is the requirement that the
communications involve parties who share a common interest if the
privilege is to apply. This interest is not easily defined and is impossible
to apply in a predictable way in such a vast array of scenarios. All courts
agree that parties in an allied lawyer setting who claim privilege
342
protection must prove the existence of a common interest. Though an
acceptable common interest almost always involves a more limited level
343
of interest than in the joint representation setting, there is no
344
agreement as to the appropriate level of common interest required.
In fact, developing a definition of common interest that can be
applied across the panoply of fact situations seems a daunting task. For
example, a widely-quoted test of common interest is that of Duplan
345
Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc. The Duplan court stated,
A community of interest exists among different persons or
separate corporations where they have an identical legal interest
with respect to the subject matter of a communication between an
attorney and a client concerning legal advice. . . . The key
consideration is that the nature of the interest be identical, not
346
similar, and be legal, not solely commercial.
347

Another typical treatment is found in SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp.
There, the court stated that the legal interests must be “demonstrably
common” or the clients must have “substantial” risk of shared

342. See In re Teleglobe Commc’ns Corp., 493 F.3d 345, 364 (3d Cir. 2007) (discussing
the requirement); see also RICE, supra note 19, § 4:35.
343. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 72, § 5:20, at 571 (“[E]ach client has her
own lawyer, and it is understood that their common interest is limited and they are already
(or potentially) adversaries on other related matters, in a situation in which a single lawyer
could not properly represent both.”); see also discussion supra Part IV.B.4.
344. See RICE, supra note 19, § 4:36 (“There is no clear standard for measuring the
community of interests that must exist for the privilege to apply.”).
345. 397 F. Supp. 1146 (D.S.C. 1974).
346. Id. at 1172. Duplan is still the majority rule. See RICE, supra note 19, § 4:36. The
Restatement definition is broader. It states: “[T]he common interest . . . may be either legal,
factual, or strategic in character. The interests of the separately represented clients need not
be entirely congruent.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 76
cmt. e (2000).
347. 70 F.R.D. 508 (D. Conn. 1976).
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348

exposure.
In Fox News Network, LLC v. U.S. Department of the
349
Treasury, the court stated that “[t]he interest must be a common legal
350
The court
interest, not merely a common commercial interest.”
continued that “[s]uch a common interest exists where ‘the parties have
been, or may potentially become, co-parties to a litigation . . . or have
351
formed a coordinated legal strategy.’”
Common interest might be a simple concept easily applied if the
context is cooperation of two criminal defendants. But courts today
apply a privilege in all sorts of allied lawyer civil settings. Sometimes
the parties who have joined together are plaintiffs rather than
352
defendants. Sometimes the parties working together are not involved
353
Defining and analyzing the
in any current or potential litigation.
existence of a common interest in such a variety of contexts is beyond
the reach of most mortals.
The task of interpreting these definitions of common interest and
applying these statements is largely one left to the judgment of the
reviewing court long after the communication has occurred and the
privilege has been claimed. The common interest requirement is simply
too malleable on a case by case basis to provide any certainty with
regard to its application.
2. Confusion About the Necessity of an Agreement
There are other areas of confusion that make application of the
privilege to the allied lawyer setting problematic. For example, courts
disagree about whether an agreement to work together jointly is
necessary. This is a manifestation of disagreement about the extent to
which there must be proof of joint intent. In Hunton & Williams v. U.S.

348. Id. at 524–25; see also Square D Co. v. E.I. Elecs., Inc., 264 F.R.D. 385, 391 (N.D.
Ill. 2009) (requiring a “common legal interest . . . as opposed to a common commercial
interest”).
349. 739 F. Supp. 2d 515 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
350. Id. at 563.
351. Id. at 563 (quoting In re Subpoena Duces Tecum Served on N.Y. Marine & Gen.
Ins. Co., No. M 8-85 (MHD), 1997 WL 599399, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 1997)); see also
Schaffzin, Common Interest, supra note 247, at 69–74 (discussing definitions and applications
of the common interest standard).
352. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 902 F.2d 244, 249 (4th Cir. 1990).
353. See In re Teleglobe Commc’ns Corp., 493 F.3d 345, 364 (3d Cir. 2007) (“It applies in
civil and criminal litigation, and even in purely transactional contexts.”); see also RICE, supra
note 19, § 4:35.
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354

Department of Justice, the court rejected the notion that “mere
355
‘indicia’ of joint strategy” provides the required intent to collaborate.
The court stated, “While agreement need not assume a particular form,
356
an agreement there must be.” In HSH Nordbank AG New York
357
Branch v. Swerdlow, the court stated, “Courts in this circuit have
acknowledged that although the common interest doctrine applies only
where a party has demonstrated the existence of an agreement to pursue
358
a common legal strategy, the agreement need not be in writing.” And
359
in Avocent Redmond Corp. v. Rose Electronics, Inc., the court stated,
“A written agreement is not required, but the parties must invoke the
privilege: they must intend and agree to undertake a joint defense
360
effort.”
In Hunydee v. United States, however, the court made no mention of
the existence of an agreement in a matter in which it seemed there was
361
no agreement. There is a danger that recognizing a common interest
of some sort may be taken as sufficient proof of intent to proceed
jointly.
If there is a joint defense or prosecution agreement (or some other
agreement to jointly proceed in an allied lawyer setting), and if that
agreement, as it usually does, commits the parties to maintaining the
confidentiality of information revealed in the context of the joint
endeavor, then the parties to the agreement are contractually bound to
not reveal the information to third parties. Such an agreement is
evidence of a joint endeavor for purposes of a court applying the
354. 590 F.3d 272 (4th Cir. 2010).
355. Id. at 284–85.
356. Id. at 285; see also United States v. Weissman, 195 F.3d 96, 100 (2d Cir. 1999)
(finding no joint privilege because no joint defense agreement existed at the time of the
communication); Post v. Killington, Ltd., 262 F.R.D. 393, 397 (D. Vt. 2009) (“[T]he critical
questions are whether those making and receiving the challenged communications (1)
actually had a common interest with respect to the investor passes, and (2) had reached a
joint strategy agreement at the time the communications were made.”); Lugosch v. Congel,
219 F.R.D. 220, 237 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) (“In order . . . for documents and communications
shared amongst these litigants to be considered confidential, there must exist an agreement,
though not necessarily in writing, embodying a cooperative and common enterprise towards
an identical legal strategy.”).
357. 259 F.R.D. 64 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
358. Id. at 72 n.12.
359. 516 F. Supp. 2d 1199 (W.D. Wash. 2007).
360. Id. at 1203.
361. 355 F.2d 183 (9th Cir. 1965); see also discussion of the Hunydee case supra Part
III.B.3.
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attorney–client privilege and is evidence of the intent of the parties to
maintain confidentiality. The agreement should not, however, control
the application of the privilege; a communication should not be
privileged because the parties agree that it is. Only the courts should be
362
the arbiters of whether the privilege applies to communications.
3. Confusion About the Necessity of Litigation
A third source of confusion about the application of the privilege to
the allied lawyer setting is that courts do not agree about whether
litigation must exist for the privilege to apply. Some courts apply the
363
privilege in allied lawyer settings not involving litigation.
For
364
example, in United States v. United Technologies Corp., the court
applied the privilege to a situation in which members of a joint endeavor
shared legal advice in an effort to minimize tax liabilities. The
communications at issue “pertain[ed] to the development of a common
legal strategy” and “the members acted not as adversaries negotiating at
365
arms length but as collaborators.” Justifying this stance, the court in
United States v. BDO Seidman, LLP, stated that “[r]eason and
experience demonstrate that joint venturers, no less than individuals,
benefit from planning their activities based on sound legal advice
362. See Visual Scene, Inc. v. Pilkington Bros., 508 So. 2d 437, 441 n.4 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1987) (“Of course, the mere existence of an agreement between parties to keep
documents confidential is not, in itself, sufficient to protect them from discovery under a
claim of privilege.”); see also Schaffzin, Common Interest, supra note 247, at 81–83 (explaining
that the agreement cannot create the privilege).
363. In Fox News Network, LLC v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 739 F. Supp. 2d 515, 563
(S.D.N.Y. 2010), the court stated, “Although the doctrine is most frequently applied in the
context of litigation, it also has been successfully invoked with respect to joint legal strategies
in non-litigation settings.”
364. 979 F. Supp. 108 (D. Conn. 1997).
365. Id. at 112; see also Evergreen Trading, LLC ex rel. Nussdorf v. United States, 80
Fed. Cl. 122, 144 (2007) (noting that “communications are privileged as against third parties,
whether or not there is actual litigation in progress” (citing United States v. Aramony, 88 F.3d
1369, 1392 (4th Cir. 1996))); LG Elecs. U.S.A., Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 661 F. Supp. 2d 958,
965 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (“The fact that Whirlpool’s communications with its outside agencies
were not in the context of litigation is of no moment because communications ‘need not be
made in anticipation of litigation to fall within the common interest doctrine.’” (quoting
United States v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 492 F.3d 806, 816 (7th Cir. 2007))); HSH Nordbank AG
N.Y. Branch v. Swerdlow, 259 F.R.D. 64, 71 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“The doctrine ‘precludes a
waiver of the underlying privilege concerning confidential communications between the
parties made in the course of an ongoing common enterprise and intended to further the
enterprise, irrespective of whether an actual litigation is in progress.’” (quoting Sokol v.
Wyeth, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 8442(SHS)(KNF), 2008 WL 3166662, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2008))).
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366

predicated upon open communication.”
In contrast, other courts require litigation to be on the horizon. In
367
United States v. Newell, the court stated that only two types of
communications are privileged in the allied lawyer setting:
“communications between co-defendants in actual litigation and their
counsel . . . [and] communications between potential co-defendants and
their counsel . . . if there is ‘a palpable threat of litigation at the time of
368
the communication.’”
The Newell court continued, “a cognizable
common legal interest does not exist if a group of individuals seeks legal
counsel to avoid conduct that might lead to litigation, but rather only if
369
they request advice to ‘prepar[e] for future litigation.’”
4. Confusion About Whom the Communication Must Involve
Another source of confusion about the application of the privilege to
the allied lawyer setting is that courts do not agree about who must be
involved in a communication for the privilege to apply to that
communication. There is some agreement. Courts agree that the
privilege can apply when two lawyers, each representing a separate
member of a group working together, share otherwise privileged
370
The attorneys are sharing information gleaned from
information.
confidential conversations with their respective clients. The purpose of
the original communications was obtaining legal advice and not in
furtherance of a crime or fraud. As the Third Circuit in In re Teleglobe
Communications Corp. stated with regard to requiring the
366. 492 F.3d at 816.
367. 315 F.3d 510 (5th Cir. 2002).
368. Id. at 525 (quoting In re Santa Fe Int’l Corp., 272 F.3d 705, 710, 711 (5th Cir. 2001)).
369. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Santa Fe Int’l Corp., 272 F.3d at 713).
370. See, e.g., Cooper Health Sys. v. Virtua Health, Inc., 259 F.R.D. 208, 214 (D.N.J.
2009) (“Further, the privilege does not extend to communications between non-attorneys
who simply have a joint interest. The community of interest privilege is applicable to
communications amongst attorneys, ‘to be eligible for continued protection, the
communication must be shared with the attorney of the member of the community of
interest.’” (quoting In re Teleglobe Commc’ns Corp., 493 F.3d 345, 364 (3d Cir. 2007))); see
also United States v. Bay State Ambulance & Hosp. Rental Serv., Inc., 874 F.2d 20, 29 (1st
Cir. 1989) (“When a person provides information to another without first consulting his own
attorney, it is difficult to see how the information was given as part of a joint defense, even
when the recipient may be viewed as a party with similar interests. The difficulty grows when
the person furnishing the information fails to inform his attorney of what he has done for
several months. This raises the inference that the information was not intended to be used for
that person’s defense much less a joint defense. Under these circumstances, the joint defense
privilege is not available.”).
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communication to involve attorneys, “The attorney-sharing requirement
helps prevent abuse by ensuring that the common-interest privilege only
supplants the disclosure rule when attorneys, not clients, decide to share
371
information in order to coordinate legal strategies.”
Some courts may not require both parties to the communication to
372
be attorneys but may require the presence of at least one attorney.
Some courts are even less demanding. For example, in Gucci America,
Inc. v. Gucci, the District Court for the Southern District of New York
explicitly rejected the notion that an attorney was necessary for the
373
communication to be privileged.
The court stated, “If information
that is otherwise privileged is shared between parties that have a
common legal interest, the privilege is not forfeited even though no
374
attorney either creates or receives the communication.” Other courts
375
agree.
371. Id. at 365.
372. See United States v. Gotti, 771 F. Supp. 535, 545 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (“The defendants
would extend the application of the joint defense privilege to conversations among the
defendants themselves even in the absence of any attorney during the course of those
conversations. Such an extension is supported neither in law nor in logic and is rejected.”);
see also Square D Co. v. E.I. Elecs., Inc., 264 F.R.D. 385, 391 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (denying the
privilege and stating, “EI has not even demonstrated that the subject communications were
made to or by an attorney”); Post v. Killington, Ltd., 262 F.R.D. 393, 397 (D. Vt. 2009)
(holding there is no privilege in absence of attorneys); Harper-Wyman Co. v. Conn. Gen. Life
Ins. Co., No. 86 C 9595, 1991 WL 62510, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 17, 1991) (“This is
problematical, as communications between joint plaintiffs or joint defendants outside of
counsel’s presence are not protected under the joint defense theory.”).
373. No. 07 Civ. 6820, 2008 WL 5251989, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2008).
374. Id.
375. See, e.g., Zitzka v. Vill. of Westmont, No. 07 C 0949, 2009 WL 1346256, at *2 (N.D.
Ill. May 13, 2009) (“Importantly for our purposes here, the common interest doctrine may
apply in certain circumstances to communications between two non-lawyers who are both
covered by the common interest.”); HSH Nordbank AG N.Y. Branch v. Swerdlow, 259
F.R.D. 64, 71 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (responding to party’s argument that the privilege did not
apply to sharing of a communication with a third party and argument that the privilege
applied only to sharing with the third party’s lawyer, and finding the argument “meritless”);
Reginald Martin Agency, Inc. v. Conseco Med. Ins. Co., 460 F. Supp. 2d 915, 918 (S.D. Ind.
2006) (“Defendants urge this Court to adopt those cases that appear to stand for the
proposition that the common interest doctrine does not extend attorney–client privilege to
communications between parties made outside the presence of counsel. While such a
conclusion is tempting on first blush, closer scrutiny suggests otherwise.”).
In Pucket v. Hot Springs School District No. 23-2, the court stated,
In IBJ Whitehall Bank & Trust Co., the third-party defendant sought discovery of
several communications between two parties who had a common interest. The
third-party defendant argued that the common interest doctrine did not apply

08-GIESEL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

558

3/20/2012 2:05 PM

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[95:475

With so much confusion surrounding the application of the
attorney–client privilege in the allied lawyer setting, clients and lawyers
cannot predict with any degree of certainty whether a communication
will enjoy the protection of the privilege. If clients and lawyers cannot
predict that communications will be protected from disclosure, these
clients and lawyers cannot be encouraged to speak freely. Thus, any of
the goals sought to be accomplished by applying the privilege in the
allied lawyer setting are not achieved.
VI. CONCLUSION
The attorney–client privilege, throughout history, has applied to the
joint client representation setting. Courts and commentators have never
directly questioned this application, nor should they question it. The
attorney–client privilege is as inherent a part of a joint representation as
it is in any attorney–client relationship. Applying the privilege in the
joint client representation setting is consistent with the privilege’s
underlying rationale. Unfortunately, some courts may have become a
bit confused about the privilege’s application to the joint client setting;
this confusion is an unfortunate result of courts struggling with the
privilege in the allied lawyer setting.
In contrast and contrary to the practice of modern courts, courts
should not apply the privilege to the allied lawyer setting. Applying the
privilege in this setting does not further the rationale of the attorney–
client privilege and such application contradicts the traditional approach
of applying the privilege narrowly. In addition, the precedential basis
for applying the privilege in the allied lawyer setting is that the allied
lawyer setting and the joint client representation setting are identical.
They are not. Communications in the joint client situation are
communications between attorney and clients of that attorney. Such is
not the case in the allied lawyer setting.

because the communications occurred outside the presence of the parties’
attorneys. . . .
This court finds the district court’s reasoning in IBJ Whitehall Bank & Trust
Co. . . . persuasive. The court thus adopts it here. As a result, the court finds that
Spitzer’s communication of confidential, privileged legal advice from the Becket
Fund attorneys to the Puckets is protected by the common interest doctrine, even if
these communications occurred outside the presence of the Becket Fund attorneys.
239 F.R.D. 572, 583–84 (D.S.D. 2006) (discussing IBJ Whitehall Bank & Trust Co. v. Cory &
Assocs., No. CIV. A. 97 C 5827, 1999 WL 617842 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 12, 1999)).
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The United States Supreme Court in University of Pennsylvania v.
EEOC, a case involving the question of creating a privilege for peerreview communications, noted that because a privilege keeps evidence
from the truth-finder, “[w]e do not create and apply an evidentiary
privilege unless it ‘promotes sufficiently important interests to outweigh
376
the need for probative evidence.’” If courts today were writing on a
blank slate such that no precedent existed that recognized the attorney–
client privilege in the allied lawyer setting, those courts would not create
such a doctrine.
Courts looking at the matter anew would note that recognition of a
privilege would be an expansion of the privilege. The expansion would
contradict the historical guiding principle that courts must apply the
privilege narrowly because it inhibits the truth-finding mission of the
justice system. Courts would conclude that recognizing the attorney–
client privilege in the allied lawyer situation would not further the
rationale of the privilege—encouraging client disclosure to the client’s
attorney for the ultimate goal of superior legal service. Courts would
conclude that no possible rationale justifies an expansion of the privilege
to the allied lawyer setting given the accompanying harm such an
expansion does to the truth-finding mission of the judicial system.
Finally, these courts would understand that the allied lawyer setting is
fundamentally different from the joint client representation setting. The
nature of the relationship between attorneys and clients is different. In
the joint client representation setting, the attorney–client privilege
protects communications involving an attorney and that attorney’s
clients. The same cannot be said when the privilege is applied in the
allied lawyer setting. In the allied lawyer setting, communications not
involving a lawyer and the lawyer’s client may be privileged.
Because courts today are not writing on a blank slate but have the
benefit of recent precedent, it is clear that applying the privilege to the
allied lawyer setting has resulted in a level of confusion of application
that undermines any possible value created. There is confusion about
the kind of commonality necessary between the parties in the allied
377
lawyer setting.
There is confusion about whether the parties must
reach an agreement to work together and the form such an agreement

376. 493 U.S. 182, 189 (1990) (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980)).
377. See supra Part V.F.
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should take.
There is confusion about whether the matter must
379
involve litigation. There is confusion about who can be a part of the
380
communication. All of these defects of clarity destroy the certainty of
application necessary for the privilege to achieve its goals. As an added
collateral effect, some of this confusion with regard to the allied lawyer
setting also has created confusion with courts when they are dealing
with the joint client representation situation—a setting, historically, that
has been a model of clarity.
In recent years courts have applied the attorney–client privilege in
the allied lawyer setting without evaluating the basic normative question
of whether the privilege should apply at all. The courts have focused on
the trees, not the forest. The courts have assumed that Chahoon v.
Commonwealth, the case that first applied the privilege to the allied
381
lawyer setting, is theoretically sound.
In fact, the analysis of the
Chahoon court is flawed in concluding that the allied lawyer setting and
the joint client setting should be treated alike for purposes of the
attorney–client privilege.
Now is the time to evaluate the application of the attorney–client
privilege to the allied lawyer setting. The vast majority of cases applying
the privilege to the allied lawyer setting have been in the last few
decades. Now is the time to acknowledge the error and correct it.
With respect to privileges in the federal system, the Third Circuit
382
Court of Appeals stated in Pearson v. Miller, “[F]ederal courts are
to assess the appropriateness of new privileges as they arise in
particular cases, but they are to conduct that assessment with a
recognition that only the most compelling candidates will overcome
the law’s weighty dependence on the availability of relevant
383
evidence.”
Courts should cast fresh eyes on the application of the attorney–
client privilege in the allied lawyer setting and “assess the
384
appropriateness” of such an application. As a result of such analysis,
courts should conclude that the allied lawyer setting is not such a
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.

See supra Part V.F.1.
See supra Part V.F.3.
See supra Part V.F.4.
See supra Parts III.B–.C.
211 F.3d 57 (3d Cir. 2000).
Id. at 67.
Id.
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“compelling candidate”
privilege.

385. Id.

385

561

for application of the attorney–client

